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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(j). This case was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to this Court pursuant to
Notice dated April 27, 2001.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE #1
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN SETTING AS THE VALUATION DATE
IN THIS EMINENT DOMAIN ACTION THE DATE WHEN JONES AND
BARKER WERE ALLOWED TO INTERVENE RATHER THAN THE DATE
SUMMONS WAS SERVED ON THE PROPERTY OWNER, AS MANDATED
BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-11?
Standard of Review:
The standard of review for this issue is correction of error in which no deference is
accorded the trial court because the lower court's ruling was based on its
interpretation of a statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11, and State Road Commission
v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984), and in response to a Motion for Declaratory
Judgment. See State v. Montova. 887 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1994).
ISSUE #2
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING DAVIS COUNTY'S MOTION
IN LIMINE AND ADMITTING SALES AND DEFENDANTS' EXPERT
OPINION WHICH WERE ENHANCED AND INCREASED BY THE
PUBLIC PROJECT FOR WHICH THE PROPERTY WAS CONDEMNED?

Standard of Review:
The standard of review for this issue is correction of error because the trial court
based its ruling on its interpretation of legal precedents. Montoya, 887 P.2d at 858.

The correction of error standard is applicable because the trial court's ruling was
based on its interpretation of Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Grutter,
734 P.2d 434, 427 (Utah 1986) (holding that "in condemnation proceedings any
enhancement... in value attributable to the purpose for which the property is being
condemned shall be excluded in determining the fair market value of the property").
ISSUE #3
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING DAVIS COUNTY'S MOTION
IN LIMINE THAT THE JURY NOT BE INFORMED THAT AN ALLEGED
WEALTHY, PRIVATE, NON-PARTY LAND DEVELOPER WOULD PAY
THE AMOUNT AWARDED BY THE JURY?
Standard of Review:
The standard of review for this issue is correction of error because the trial court
based its ruling on pretrial briefing and argument. Thus, this Court is in the same
position as the trial court to consider and decide this issue. State v. 01 sen, 860 P.2d
332, 335 (Utah 1993). Also, the correction of error standard applies to the trial
court's selection, interpretation and application of a particular rule of evidence. State
v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 713-14 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948
(Utah 1993).
ISSUE #4
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER, IN
CONNECTION WITH DAVIS COUNTY'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, AN
AFFIDAVIT CONCLUSIVELY RESOLVING AN ISSUE WHICH THE
TRIAL COURT DEEMED DISPOSITIVE IN ESTABLISHING ITS AUGUST
13, 1998 VALUATION DATE-WHETHER DAVIS COUNTY KNEW OR
HAD REASON TO KNOW THAT JONES AND BARKER HAD AN
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AT THE TIME DAVIS COUNTY
FILED ITS COMPLAINT IN AUGUST 1997?

Standard of Review:
The standard of review for this issue is abuse of discretion. See Timm v.
Dewsnup. 921 P.2d 1381, 1388 (Utah 1996).
ISSUE #5
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST ACCRUED FROM THE DATE OF ITS FIRST ORDER OF
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY, OCTOBER 31, 1997, DESPITE ITS SETTING
ASIDE THAT ORDER TO ALLOW JONES AND BARKER TO
CHALLENGE THE PUBLIC NECESSITY OF THIS CONDEMNATION
ACTION?
Standard of Review:
The standard of review for this issue is also the correction of error standard. The
award of prejudgment interest presents a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Baillev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann. §78-34-11
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9
State Road Commission v. Friberg. 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984)
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Grutter. 734 P.2d 434 (Utah 1986)
Copies of these authorities are included in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a condemnation action brought by Davis County to acquire a total parcel of
14.75 acres of inaccessible wet lands and meadows of the defendant landowners in
Farmington, Utah, just north of where the 1-15 freeway and State Highway 89 merge. The

condemnation complaint was filed on August 29, 1997, and summons was served upon the
owner of record five days later on September 3, 1997.
The condemned property (the "Kerr Property") was part of the Max Kerr Trust, the
Trustee being Zions First National Bank. In an October 2, 1997 hearing before the Court
on Davis County's Motion for Immediate Occupancy, the Trustee acknowledged that it was
the "real party in interest" in the case, and the Trustee's Answer to the complaint stated as
fact that it was the only party with any cognizable interest in the Kerr Property. The
landowner did not contest Davis County's entitlement to condemn and the case was set
down for trial on the issue of Just Compensation to be measured as of the date of service of
summons, September 3, 1997, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11.
Six months later, in April 1998, Jones and Barker moved to intervene in the case
claiming that it was a contract purchaser in the property in May 1997, and therefore had a
recognizable interest in the property. The purchase contract obligated Jones and Barker to
buy only upon certain conditions taking place, which conditions never occurred. However,
Davis County did not object to the intervention, per se, and the Order of Intervention was
granted on August 13, 1998.
Thereafter, on the motion of Jones and Barker, the trial court erroneously changed
the statutory date of assessment of Just Compensation from September 3, 1997 to August
13, 1998, the date that the Order of Intervention happened to be signed. Jones and Barker
wound up stipulating to Davis County's entitlement to condemn and the case went to trial
using the erroneous valuation date on March 6, 2000. At the trial, the District Judge, over
the timely objection and motion in limine of Davis County, permitted three sales of other
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calculated the interest from October 3 1 , 1997 totaling $281,498.30.

r. 'S
- the District Court

From a denial of Davis County's motion for new trial and application to submit a
post-verdict affidavit from the Deputy Davis County Attorney, this appeal was taken to this
Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Condemnation Action, Service of Summons and Initial Order of Immediate
Occupancy.
This condemnation action was initiated by Davis County on August 29, 1997, to

condemn the Kerr Property, 14.75 acres of soggy bottom land. (R. at 1.) Davis County
named the only entity with a legally cognizable, recorded interest-defendant, Zions First
National Bank as trustee of the Max Kerr Trust. (R. at 1, 1195 pp. 11-13.) In fact, the
property was wholly owned by defendant. (R. at 2, 26.) Defendant confirmed to Davis
County that it was the real party in interest when it "[a]dmitted" in its Answer that it was the
owner of the Kerr Property and acknowledged at a hearing that it was the "[r]eal party in
interest." (R. at 2, 26, 1194 p. 69.) Davis County served summons on defendant on
September 3, 1997, the date statutorily defined as the date on which fair market value and
just compensation is to be determined. Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11. (R. at 14-16.)
With its Complaint. Davis County filed a motion for immediate occupancy of the
Kerr Property. (R. at 10-11.) A hearing on the motion was held on October 21, 1997, and
defendant raised the issue of Davis County's entitlement to condemn the Kerr Property. (R.
at 24. 1194 pp. 4, 6.) The trial court, however, found that the condemnation action was
supported by a valid public use. (R. at 64-66.) On October 31, 1997, the trial court entered
an order allowing Davis County to occupy the Kerr Property. (R. at 64-66.)

1

! i i,UNIT of the Public Project.
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~ \ 1209 Ex. 1 and Ex 2.^ \ mar - r t h e

Farmington Preserve project area is attached ^ k\iui)i
3.

- .vddenaui

Nature of the Kerr Property.
i

. . . . . . ^oii^ists oi 14.75 acres of vacant land immediately to the north of

where 1-15 ami State Highway 89 merge in Farmington City

As stated above

m, Kerr

Property and surrounding areas have been encumbered with wetlands, wet meadows and
periodic flooding, particularly the low lying areas closest to the highway. (R at 1194 pp.
17-24, 40, 46.) Of this area, the Kerr Property was the closest to the highway and was itself
laden with wetlands on 12-14 of its 14.75 acres. (R. at 1200 p. 160.) A map of the area in
which the Kerr Properly is situated is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Addendum. (R. at 1209
Ex.67.)
The defendants themselves described the Kerr Property as "soupy" and saddled with
"standing water." (R. at 1200 pp. 4, 7.) Also, defendants' real estate expert reported that
the Kerr Property was susceptible to flooding:
The subject and surrounding properties are susceptible to periodic flooding as the line
under 1-15 is inadequate in size to handle the flows of Spring Creek and Shepherd
Creek as well as general drainage from areas east of the subject resulting from a
major flooding event. The water therefore backs up from this culvert and has on
occasion inundated portions of the subject and surrounding property.
(R. at 1209 Ex. 73 p. 23.)
In addition, the Kerr Property had no access for commercial purposes. The Kerr
Property was physically accessible by only two roads, 1100 West and Burke Lane. (R. at
1201 pp. 240-41.)

Neither of these roads, however, were adequate for commercial

development of the Kerr Property, as defendants' appraiser himself acknowledged. (R. at
1209 Ex. 73 p. 24.)
The Kerr Property had never been developed for any use. Defendants had no
evidence of plans for commercial or even residential development of the Kerr Property. In
fact, under federal law, the Kerr Property's wetlands could not be disturbed without a permit

from the Corp, and tl le Cot p had never i w k ,..
.
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\pi-

">>>

(ones and Barker t\vr !n~i developers

intervene ' i* ,r ^ - -

-* motion to

In

23,

ic rvcn Piopem »x Jones/Barkei Contract"),

entered into after the announcement of Davis County's commitment to condemn it (R at
83-9-1 131.926 1200pp.^8 80-81 i?(V* r * ' ^ c o ^ ^ . i ^ l ^
is attached as Exhibit

*M
(

I

- n c , A^A Barker 1 w .

-- ^

^unuacL, ilic ino^t Jones and Barker had was a conditional,

executory contraa to bus the Ken h o p e m
conditions, two of which never happened

TIIL
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(R. at 89, 94.) Defendants admitted that "[t]h[e] agreements [between PP A and Davis
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Also, the Jones/Barker Contract required that closing occur "180 days from
acceptance." (R. at 91.) May 23, 1997 was the date of acceptance. (R. at 93.) Therefore,
the closing had to occur on or before November 20, 1997. At trial in March 2000, not only
did defendants represent that there had been no closing on the contract, but they argued and
presented evidence that "[Davis County] took away Mr. Kerr's ability to sell the property,"
and "[no] actual transactions involving the subject. . . have occurred." (R. at 1200 pp. 78,
1201 p. 219, 1209 Ex. 73 p. 4 (emphasis added).
The stated purchase price of the Jones/Barker Contract was $531,000, and Jones and
Barker made a "earnest money deposit" of only $ 1,000. (R. at 87, 131.) The $1,000 deposit
was refundable if the stated conditions, such as the ability to develop the property, were not
met. (R. at 89. 94.)
Davis County first became aware of the Jones/Barker Contract well after it filed and
served its Complaint. (R. at 268, 1087, 1205 pp. 7, 11.) At the time it filed its Complaint,
Davis County believed that Jones and Barker had, at most, an unexercised option to buy the
Kerr Property that was conditioned on events that could not occur. (R. at 1084-87.) On
October 21, 1997, intervener Tod B. Jones hand-delivered to Davis County's counsel an
October 21. 1997 letter signed by Jones and Barker indicating that they had an alleged
interest in the Kerr Property "by virtue of a real estate contract." (R. at 268, 277, 1087.) The
exchange occurred on the steps to the courthouse when Davis County's counsel was on his
way to a hearing on Davis County's motion for immediate occupancy of the Kerr Property.
(R. at 268, 1087.) After the exchange, both Jones and Barker attended the hearing on Davis
County's motion. (R. at 1195 p. 4.)

Despite their awareness of the condei i n latioi i acti- : i i )• : t lies at it :i Bai 1 ;ei v 'ait *• :i i it iti!
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condemn, however, Jones and Barker stipulated that Davis County's condemnation action
was based on a valid public purpose. (R. at 237-39.)
6.

Jones and Barker's Motion to Change the Statutory Date for Determining
Fair Market Value and Just Compensation.

Days later, Jones and Barker filed a motion to require the court to change the date of
valuation from the mandatory service of summons date, September 3, 1997, of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-34-11. (R. at 251.) While Jones and Barker acknowledged that Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-34-11 directed that the valuation date "shall be . . . the date of service of summons,"
they urged the trial court to disregard that statute. (R. at 254.) Jones and Barker argued that
the valuation date should be either March 8, 1999, "the date on which [Davis County's] right
to condemn the interveners' property was finally established," or August 13, 1998, when the
order making Jones and Barker parties to this case was signed. (R. at 249.)
In a bench ruling, the trial court adopted the date Jones and Barker were admitted as
parties, August 13, 1998, as the valuation date. (R. at 286, 311-12.) The court did not find
that a departure from the statutory valuation date was necessary to satisfy the requirement
of just compensation of Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution. Instead, the trial court
reasoned that it would be "unfair" to use the September 3, 1997 service of summons date
"because the interveners were not made a party in September of 1997." (R. at 1198 p. 38.)
The court also ruled that defendant could take advantage of the August 13, 1998 valuation
date by merely "consent[ingj" to it. (R. at 1198 pp. 38-39.)

Motion in Limine on Defendants" Appraisal by J. Phillip Cook and
Source of Payment of the Condemnation Award.
I

i\ib County filed a motion n i limine regarding the
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( \u)\\\ valuation was based, three of them were PBA sales, and he relied most heavily on
one of them (R at 1209 Ex. 73 pp. 30-35, 45-46, 1?r* pp. 255-59, 264, 267,,,) The sales
on which Cook iclinl were:
a. '.•

February —.-. « '. sale of 29.216 acres from PBA to Shepard Creek
Properties, LLC for $115,501 per acre.

b.

August 3 1 1999 sale of 10.924 acres from PBA to Shepard Creek Properties,
LI.C for $304,920 per acre.

c.-

February 26, 1997 sale of 25 aci esftoi i i PB • * tc • PSC Dei ' elopi i lei it Company
for $92,000 per acre.

d.

August
: ' o u salt- oi 4o lH acu-- V *m \f n I short (trustee of the
Bambergei Family '! HM \ nv 1 asviou loi $95,928 per act e

e.

November 1, 1998 sale of 10.37 acres from WS Hatch Comp., Inc. to
Kalatham Properties for $108,973 per acre.

(R. at 1209 Ex. 73 pp. 30-38.) Cook used the per/acre prices at which such parcels sold and
opined that each acre of the Kerr Property was worth a similar amount. (R. at 1209 Ex. 73
pp. 45-46, 1201 pp. 264-65.)
PBA's sales were not the only aspect of the Farmington Preserve project on which
Cook relied. Cook opined that the highest and best use of the Kerr Properly was high
density commercial development. (R. at 1201 pp. 275-76.) To overcome the lack of
commercial access to the Kerr Property, Cook relied on a road constructed as part of the
Farmington Preserve project, the Shepherd Creek Parkway, which stopped well short of the
Kerr Property. (R. at 1201 p. 277.) Cook attributed the termination of the parkway to the
condemnation of the Kerr Property and assumed that but for the condemnation, the parkway
would have been extended to the Kerr Property. (R. at 1201 pp. 240, 247-48.)
Due to his reliance on the PBA development, Cook appraised the Kerr Property at
$ 1,606,500, over three times the $531,000 price set forth in the real estate purchase contract
defendants entered into barely three months before this action. (R. at 131, 1209 Ex. 73.)
In support of its motion in limine, Davis County argued that reliance on PBA's
development in the Farmington Preserve project violated a fundamental tenet of condemned
property valuation, and one to which Cook even acknowledged. (R. at 375-78.) Cook
admitted that "[i]t is inappropriate to consider the effect of the intended [condemnation]
project in establishing market value of a property being condemned." (1209 Ex. 73 p. 23,
R. at 1201 p. 216.) Cook violated this rule by using as "comparable" sales the three PBA
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(R. at 1201 p. 313-14.)
Defendants admitted throughout this case that PBA's properties within the
Farmington Preserve were benefitted and enhanced by the condemnation of the Kerr
Property. (R. at 21, 23-24, 27, 131-32,398-99,431-32, 1195 pp. 4-5, 1196 p. 6, 1199 p. 9,
1200 pp. 8, 36, 38-41, 1201 pp. 255-57, 319-20, 382, 1202 pp. 455-56, 459, 481-82, 519.)
Even in connection with Davis County's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the sold
PBA parcels, defendants admitted that the value of such parcels were enhanced by the
condemnation of the Kerr Property:
Each party to the proceeding received something from it. . . . The county gets its
retention basin. The city gets some trails and some nice green space and an increased
tax base, which was actively argued to them as a benefit for allowing this project to
proceed. And [PBA] gets a development and shifts the burden of his wetlands, the
burden of his drainage onto the Kerr Property.
(R. at 1199 p. 9 (emphasis added).) Defendants even calculated the amount by which the
value of PBA's lands were enhanced by the condemnation:
[PBA] saw the potential in this undeveloped area and tried to acquire it. [It] bought
up surrounding parcels for amounts between $10,000 and $40,000 an acre. Max
Kerr, the owner of the subject property, . . . would not sell . . . , so [PBA] came up
with another plan. . . . [PBA] convinced Davis County to condemn the Kerr Property
as a flood control basin, thereby placing the entire regulatory burden of his
development on the Kerr Property. . . . Once [PBA] had an agreement with Davis
County, he went ahead and sold his property for amounts between $92,000 and
$304,920 an acre.
(R. at 431-32 (emphasis added).)

By defendants" own admission, Davis County's

condemnation of the Kerr Property caused PBA's parcels to skyrocket in value, from
between $10,000 and $40,000 an acre to between $92,000 and $304,920 an acre.

At trial, defendants continued to argue that the condemnation of the Kerr Property
enhanced the value of PBA's lands:
[T]o [have] the development it wanted, [PBA] . . . ma[d]e an arrangement with . . .
Davis County . . . [in which] all the wetlands on [PBA's] property would be pushed
down onto Mr. Kerr's. . . . Now what that did was allow [PBA] to build . . . and it
freed up the ground. Now freeing up the ground allowed a lot of things to go in. . .
. [T]he City . . . allow[ed] PBA . . . to increase its zon[ing]. So instead of being a
residential two homes per acre, they've got commercial.
(R. at 1200 p. 8 (emphasis added); see also R. at 1200 pp. 36, 38-41, 1201 pp. 319-20, 382,
1202 pp. 481,519.)
Davis County's motion in limine also sought the exclusion of evidence regarding the
source of payment of the condemnation award. (R. at 380-81.) Because the condemnation
of the Kerr Property was necessary for PBA's Farmington Preserve project, the agreements
between PBA, Davis County and Farmington City dealt with that issue. (R. at 1209 Ex. 2
pp. 2-3, Ex. 1 p. 18.) Davis County argued that fair market value and just compensation
does not depend in the slightest on the source of the payment for the condemnation award,
and it would be irrelevant and highly prejudicial for the jury to be informed that PBA, a nonparty land developer, would ultimately pay the amount awarded. (R. at 380-81.)
8.

Order of Judge Kay Permitting Evidence of Project Related
Enhancement in Value and the Source of Payment of the Condemnation
Award.

In a written order prepared by defendants' counsel, the trial court admitted evidence
of PBA's development and permitted the introduction of evidence that PBA would pay the
amount of the condemnation award. (R. at 599.) The trial court definitively "denied" Davis

County's "motion to exclude evidence that [PBA] is the ultimate source of funding to pay
for the judgment in this matter." (R. at 599.)
Later, in connection with Davis County's motion for new trial, the trial court stated
that the order meant something other than what it said. (R. at 599, 1042-43.) The trial court
stated that its order "den[ying]M Davis County's motion in limine on the issue of PBA's
payment of the condemnation award actually meant that it was "deferring]" until trial a
ruling on that issue. (R. at 1204 p. 87.) The order, however, makes clear that a ruling on
the issue was not deferred. (R. at 599.) The ruling on the issue a clear and unambiguous
"denied." (R. at 599.) If the court wanted to defer a ruling on the motion, it could have
easily stated as much, as it did with respect to other issues which were expressly "deferred"
until trial. Attached as Exhibit 8 to the Addendum is a true and correct copy of the trial
court's order.
9.

The Trial Evidence.

Pursuant to the trial court's rulings on Davis County's motion in liming, evidence of
PBA's development in the Farmington Preserve project and PBA's payment of the
condemnation award was admitted at trial. While Cook testified that Davis County's
agreement to condemn the Kerr Property made possible the three sales of PBA's properties
and the construction of Shepard Creek Parkway, he rendered his opinion of the fair market
value of the Kerr Property which heavily relied on PBA's sales and development in the
Farmington Preserve project area. (R. at 1201 pp. 255-59, 288-90.) In contrast to Cook's
$1,606,500 appraisal, Davis County's expert, who did not rely on PBA's development,

opined that the fair market value of the Kerr Property as of the August 13, 1998 valuation
date was $145,000. (R. at 1201 p. 377.)
Defendants also presented evidence and remarked at the beginning, middle and end
of the trial that PBA, a private, non-party, would pay the jury's verdict. (R. at 1004, 1200
pp. 17, 39, 1201 pp. 379, 1202 pp. 459-60, 482, 517, 1209 Ex. 1, Ex. 2.) For example,
before any witness took the stand, defense counsel made it a point to interrupt Davis
County's opening statement to reveal to the jury that PBA was going to pay the amount of
the verdict. (R. at 1200 p. 17.)
To make matters worse, the defense portrayed PBA as a wealthy developer which was
really the entity taking the Kerr Property, and doing so for its own private purposes. (R. at
1200 pp. 8,36-41, 1201pp. 319-28,379-82,402, 1202 pp. 481, 519.) For example, defense
counsel had the following exchange with defendants' appraiser:
Q.

Whose wetlands were moved to the Kerr property?

A.

The [PBA] wetlands.

Q.

And is [PBA] a-is the developer a public or a private figure?

A.

He's a private developer.

Q.

Who got a flood detention basin on their property.

A.

Well, Mr. Kerr did.

Q.

Who sold their property for over $9 million?

A.

[PBA] did.

(R. at 1201 pp. 319-20.) During his closing, defense counsel further argued:

And I want to ask you, what gives the government the right . . . to take something
from Max Kerr and give it to someone else? What gives the government the right in
a for-profit company to take Max Kerr's zoning and everything he had £tnd give it to
[PBA], to give it to a for-profit corporation?
(R. at 1202 p. 481.) Defendants argued that "as a way of justice," PBA should be forced to
pay a significant portion of that $9 million for the Kerr Property. (R. at 1201 p. 392.)
10.

The Jury Verdict.

The trial court's departure from the valuation date mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 7834-11 and its erroneous admission of the Cook appraisal and evidence and remarks that PBA
would pay the jury's award prejudiced Davis County, singly and in combination. (R. at 908.)
As a result of these legal errors, the jury awarded defendants $1,606,500, the exact amount
of Cook's appraisal and more than three times the $531,000 purchase price defendants
agreed to shortly before this action. (R. at 908, 950.)
11.

The Trial Court's Erroneous Calculation of Prejudgment Interest.

The trial court calculated interest on the jury's verdict from the date of the initial
order of immediate occupancy, October 31, 1997, even though that order was effectively
vacated when the court allowed Jones and Barker to challenge the public necessity for the
condemnation action. (R. at 197-99, 949-50.) Defendants urged the trial court to adopt
October 31, 1997 as the date from which to calculate interest. (R. at 928.) Over Davis
County's objections, the trial court adopted defendants' position and added $281,498.30 in
interest to its judgment, calculated from October 31, 1997. (R. at 949-50.) From the bench,
the trial court reasoned that while the October 31, 1997 order was void as to Jones and
Barker, it remained in effect as to defendant. (R. at 1203 pp. 7-8.)

Defendants' argument for an October 31, 1997 interest date lay in stark contrast to
their earlier position. One of defendants' arguments in support of their motion to change the
statutory valuation date was that the date from which prejudgment interest would run must
be March 8, 1999. (R. at 1198 pp. 3-4, 9-10, 34-35, 37.) Defendants apparently believed
that it would be incongruous for the interest date to precede the valuation date, so they
argued that either of their proposed valuation dates, March 8, 1999 or August 13, 1998, were
proper because there would be no possibility for interest to start running before those dates.
(R. at 1198 p. 3, 9-10, 34-35, 37.) Defendants argued that because "there was no possessory
act until following the order of immediate occupancy of March of 1999" (R. at 1198 p. 3)
and "[t]he [first] order of immediate [occupancy]... was void because it lacked jurisdiction"
(R. at 1198 pp. 9-10, 35), interest could not begin to run until March 8, 1999:
Given the fact that interest cannot be taxed in this case until the earliest of actual
possession or the date of occupancy, interest cannot begin to run until March 8th,
1999.
(R. at 1198 p. 9.)
Having achieved an August 13, 1998 valuation date, defendants felt free to take the
position that the date from which interest should be calculated is the date of the first order
of immediate occupancy, October 31, 1997. (R. at 928.)
12.

In Connection with Davis County's Motion for New Trial, the Trial
Court Refused to Consider Evidence Conclusively Establishing the
Degree of Davis County's Knowledge of Jones and Barker's Alleged
Interest in the Kerr Property in August 1997.

On May 12, 2000, Davis County filed a motion for new trial, asserting that three
errors of law committed by the trial court necessitated a retrial. (R. at 967-70, 972-85.)

o 1

Davis County argued that the trial court selected a legally erroneous valuation date, wrongly
admitted the Cook appraisal and wrongly admitted evidence that PBA would pay the jury's
verdict. (R. at 967-70, 972-85.)
Nothing in the record supported the notion that Davis County believed Jones and
Barker had an interest in the Kerr Property. In fact the Jones/Barker Contract's conditions
caused Davis County to continually question Jones and Barker's alleged interest in the Kerr
Property (R. at 113, 167, 267-68, 280-81, 1058-59.) Therefore, before it received the trial
court*s ruling, Davis County filed an affidavit of its attorney and moved for its
consideration. (R. at 1084-88.) The affidavit established that at the time it filed its
complaint, Davis County did not believe that Jones and Barker had a cognizable interest in
the Kerr Property. (R. at 1195 p. 3, 1198 p. 18.)
The trial court, however, refused to consider the affidavit. In an order denying Davis
County's motion for new trial, the trial court also denied Davis County's motion for
consideration of the affidavit of its attorney. (R. at 1178-79.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is a matter that should have been a relatively routine condemnation case.
However, by reason of the conduct of Jones and Barker having nothing to do with the
inherent market value of the Kerr Property, itself the district court was misled into making
erroneous and highly prejudicial rulings changing the statutory valuation date, permitting
sales and expert evidence based on enhanced values resulting from the public project for
which the subject property was condemned, and permitting Jones and Barker's counsel to
engage in inflammatory comment and argument that the condemnation award ultimately was

going to be paid not by Davis County, the condemnor, but by a well-to-do real estate
developer. The result was an impassioned jury verdict that was ten times in excess of the
fair market value of the land based on comparable sales that were not enhanced or
influenced by the project itself and over 300% higher than Jones and Barker had
conditionally agreed to pay under their executory, non-binding contract.
To begin with, this case began as thousands of condemnation cases in Utah do
with the filing of the complaint, on August 29, 1997, and service of summons and complaint
upon the record owner in possession of the Kerr Property on September 3, 1997. The KenTrustee appeared in the action as the "real party in interest" and an order of immediate
occupancy of the condemned property was entered on October 31, 1997, with Jones and
Barker being present in the court room during the hearing.
Six months later, on April 17, 1998, Jones and Barker filed a motion to intervene,
claiming a contract interest in the condemned property. They could have appeared, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-7 at any time since the proceeding is in rem\ the statute gives any
such claimant an unconditional right to appear, plead and defend "in respect of his own
property or interest, or that claimed by him, in the same manner as if named in the
complaint." Jones and Barker's alleged contract interest was executory, conditional and
unenforceable in every way. The purported agreement was dated May 23, 1997, the stated
purchase price was $531,000.00, and the "earnest money deposit" was the grand sum of
$1,000.00, refundable if precisely stated conditions, such as obtaining approval from
government authorities for development of the property and from the Corp of Engineers,
were not met and satisfied. Under the agreement, the conditions were required to be met

within "180 days from acceptance" i.e., November 20, 1997. Jones and Barker knew of the
existence of the condemnation case in August 1997 and as well, equally knew that their
development of the Kerr Property was impossible as of the date of service of summons, as
well as the date of occupancy by Davis County. Notwithstanding that fact, Jones and
Barker's subsequent motion to intervene of April 17, 1998, was granted on August 13, 1998.
Jones and Barker thereafter engaged in a neat little shell game, first claiming that the
property7 was theirs, then claiming before the jury that it was that of Max Kerr and then back
again. They moved to have the date of valuation altered from the statutory date of
September 3, 1997 to a manufactured date that the district judge happened to sign the order
of intervention on August 13, 1998. The trial court granted the motion finding that it would
be "unfair" to Jones and Barker if the fair market value and compensation for the
condemned property were to be established at a value date prior to their intervention.
Although Jones and Barker asked that the order of immediate occupancy of October 31,
1997 be set aside so that they could contest the entitlement of Davis County to condemn the
Kerr Property, they later stipulated without objection to the right to condemn and the case
proceeded to trial in March 2000 using a manipulated valuation date of August 31, 1998.
Only one other case in eminent domain in the entire history of Utah2 had proceeded to trial
on compensation and damages using a date other than the date which the Legislature has
declared and established under § 78-34-11.

2

State Road Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984), a case that is distinguished
absolutely from and inapposite to the instant case.

At trial, the trial judge allowed in evidence as alleged comparable sales three separate
property transactions whose value were clearly and admittedly enhanced by the public
project for which Davis County had condemned the Kerr Property. The trial court's ruling
was clear error. The trial court in Utah acts as a "gatekeeper" in determining, as a matter of
law, whether a sale meets the basic test of the willing and informed buyer and seller in the
open market without the sale having been enhanced or influenced by the public project
which caused the government to condemn the owner's property. The case law both from
the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court holds that it is reversible error
to admit such inflammatory sales or evidence.
But the issue does not stop there. The trial judge also permitted Jones and Barker's
only expert witness, J. Philip Cook, to testify as to an enhanced value of the property,
squarely predicating his opinion upon the three enhanced sales from the project, itself.
Without the use of those sales' transactions, Cook's appraisal would have been without
foundation and his value of $1,606,500 would have been less than half that sum. As it
turned out, using the enhanced sales, Cook's appraisal was more than three times the
executory purchase price of $531,000 which Jones and Barker had agreed to on May 23,
1997, barely three months before the correct date of valuation of September 3, 1997.
The admissibility of the enhanced sales and the Cook appraisal was prejudicial error
on the part of the trial court requiring a reversal and that the case be sentt back for new trial
on the issues of compensation and damages.
The trial court also permitted, over objection of Davis County, Jones and Barker's
counsel to refer repeatedly to the fact and present evidence that the condemnation award

returned by the jury was to be paid by PBA and not by Davis County. The case law in Utah
and throughout the United States prohibits evidence before the trier of fact as to the source
of the proceeds to be used to satisfy and pay the judgment. That is the law whether it is a
case in eminent domain or one involving an insured defendant. In Utah, trial courts have
consistently refused to permit evidence, argument or comment in a freeway condemnation
case that the federal government, not the taxpayers of Utah, will pay approximately 92% of
a condemnation award because the freeway is a federal-aid highway project. In the case at
Bar, the jury was apprised that another property owner and developer, PBA, who was
assisting Davis County in the Farmington Preserve, would pay for the condemnation of the
Kerr Property as part of the larger project. Such argument and comment was inflammatory
and highly prejudicial to Davis County and, without any reasonable doubt, highly influenced
the exorbitant jury verdict. For the trial court to have permitted such comment and argument
was prejudicial error.
In calculating the interest to be due on the condemnation award, the district court
engaged in an extraordinary miscalculation of prejudgment interest that gave to the
defendants a "windfall" interest of $281,498.30. The trial judge effectively vacated its first
order of immediate occupancy, and Davis County's entitlement to occupy the Kerr Property
was not established until March 8, 1999 (when Jones and Barker stipulated to the
entitlement to condemn and occupancy). Under the statutory scheme of § 78-34-9, interest
on a condemnation award can run from the date of occupancy. In this case, this was March
8, 1999.

Even defendants saw the obvious legal difficulty of calculating the interest on the
judgment from a date prior to the date of valuation, for they argued before the trial court that
there was really no possibility of interest running from a date earlier than August 13, 1998
or possibly March 8, 1999. Yet the trial judge, over the strong objection of Davis County,
engaged in a unique miscalculation of prejudgment interest starting on October 31,1997 on
a condemnation award, the valuation and market value data of which was nearly 11 months
later, August 13, 1998 and an altered occupancy date of March 8, 1999.
This bewildering calculation of interest was prejudicial error of the clearest type and
must be reversed as part of the remittitur of this case for a new trial.
Lastly, in connection with Davis County's motion for new trial, the trial judge in
defense of his position on altering the valuation date, raised, sua sponte, the question
whether the Deputy Davis County Attorney actually knew of the interest of Jones and Barker
at the time the condemnation complaint was served on September 3, 1997. In response to
that query, while the motion for new trial was pending, Davis County filed an Affidavit of
Gerald E. Hess to establish indisputably, that Davis County was not aware of any vested or
cognizable interest that Jones and Barker had in the condemned property at the time of
service of summons. In ruling on and denying Davis County's motion for new trial, the trial
judge refused to even consider said Affidavit of Mr. Hess, an officer of the Court. That was
prejudicial error that compounded the alteration by the trial court of the valuation date.
The rulings of the trial judge in this case were unmistakably erroneous, inflammatory
and highly prejudicial and resulted in an astonishing verdict of $ 1,606,500.00. That verdict

only could have been a product of the erroneous rulings of the trial court as set forth
hereinabove. A new trial is mandated, it is respectfully submitted.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT
CHANGED THE STATUTORY VALUATION DATE BY MOVING IT
FORWARD NEARLY TWELVE MONTHS.
1.

Statute 78-34-11 and Case Precedent Require That Fair Market Value Be
Determined as of the Service of Summons Date.

If there is one issue that is understood absolutely by every experienced eminent
domain lawyer and jurist in this State, it is that in determining fair market value and Just
Compensation in a condemnation case, the Legislature has statutorily declared that the date
of valuation is the day upon which summons was served upon the primary landowner. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-34-11 states unequivocally:
78-34-11. When right to damages deemed to have accrued.
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto
shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its
actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken,
but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are allowed, as
provided in Section 78-34-10.
In the thousands upon ten thousands of eminent domain cases brought in Utah over the last
120 years, the Courts have with a single exception (to be discussed infra), insisted and
mandated that 78-34-11 was the date, and the only date upon which compensation and
damages in eminent domain was to be established. As stated by the Supreme Court in State
Road ComirTn v. Bettilyon's Inc., 405 P.2d 420,422 (Utah 1965):

"This court has held that under those statues [the eminent domain code] the
measure of compensation or damages is the actual value of the land on the
date the summons is served or the land actually taken."
Id. at 422. In 1960, the Supreme Court stated the rule in State Road Common v. Valentine,
349 P.2d 321, 322-23 (Utah 1960):
"[The] well-established principle^ governing fair market value [is that such
value is] assessable at the time suit was commenced." (emphasis in original).
Id. 322-23. The legal policy behind this Legislative edict is that the date of service of
summons is not only the time in which the court obtains in rem jurisdiction over the land and
in personam jurisdiction over the owner of the land, but it is also the time in which the
condemnor must definitively plan to pay compensation and damages for the condemnation
acquisition. It sets the time, as well, for the landowner so that he may not enhance his
damages while the condemnation suit is pending. Valentine at 322; Utah Dept. of Transp.
v. Walter M. Ogden and Sons, Inc.. 805 P.2d 173, 175 (Utah 1990) ("[T]he condemnor is
entitled to a degree of certainty regarding the taking, including the date upon which
compensation must assessed. This is the policy behind section 78-34-11, which deems the
date of valuation to be the date of service of summons."); Redevelopment Agency of Salt
Lake City v. Mitsui Investment Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Utah 1974).
In the instant case, the date that the trustee of the Kerr Property, Zions First National
Bank, was served with summons was September 3, 1997. That is the date that should have
been used in the case.

Zions filed an Answer to the summons and complaint and

acknowledged that it was the "real party in interest." The fact that an additional interest such
as lessee, sub-lessee, contract purchaser, assignee, mortgagee, tax authority, or other interest

may thereafter intervene in the case claiming entitlement to the compensation and damages
to be paid, does not alter the Legislative declaration of § 78-34-11.
In this case, the trial judge treated § 78-34-11 as though it were some discretionary
recommendation which could be disregarded if it appeared "unfair." The lower court
thereupon permitted Jones and Barker to lead it astray by adopting the date that these
conditional contract buyers were permitted to intervene as parties, viz., August 13, 1998.
That date was a sheer coincidence for it just happened to be the date in which the trial judge
signed the Order of Intervention. The date in which Jones and Barker submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the court was at least six months earlier, i.e. in April, 1998.
The difficulty with placing the eminent domain date of valuation in a discretional
float is that it not only destroys the certainty of the law for both condemnor and the
landowner, but it allows the landowner, aided by a trial judge, to manipulate the date of
valuation for the landowner's benefit.

That manipulation resulted in an extraordinary

enhancement by at least fifteen (15%) percent in the compensation to which Jones and
Barker ultimately received under the jury verdict. Prejudicial error was committed by the
trial court.
2.

The Decision in State Road Commission v. Friberg Is Totally Inapposite
and It Was Prejudicial Error for the District Court to Rely Upon It.

The singular decision in over a century of jurisprudence in Utah holding that the
valuation date in eminent domain should be other than the date of service of summons as
prescribed in Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11 is State Road Comm. v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821
(Utah 1984). The district court prejudicially erred in relying upon Friberg stating that Jones

and Barker were denied due process rights by Davis County's failure to name or serve them
as conditional contract buyers of the Kerr Property.
There are two fundamental reasons why the Friberg exception to Utah Code Ann.
§78-34-11 is applicable. First, Friberg was an extremely unique case in which the State
Road Commission (now UDOT) commenced condemnation proceedings in 1972 to acquire
the artist's property in southeast Salt Lake County for the construction of 1-215. Due to the
State's failure to satisfy certain environmental issues involving 1-215, itself, it was not
known until late 1979, over 7 years after the Fribergs were served with summons, that
UDOT would actually proceed with the freeway project. It was acknowledged that during
the 7 years delay, caused by UDOT, "there had been a substantial increase in the value of
the Fribergs' land." 687 P.2d at 835. The Fribergs argued that under the specific exigencies
of a 7 year time lapse, they would be deprived of just compensation in violation of Article
I, Sec. 22 of the Utah Constitution if compensation was to be established as of 1972. The
Supreme Court, under the narrow facts presented, agreed and the valuation date was
established as of the time when UDOT's right to condemn the Fribergs' property was finally
established in 1979. Id. at 835.
In its opinion the Friberg court stated that in every case, the "presumption" for setting
the date of valuation would be that of § 78-34-11 and a "high standard" would be required
to rebut that presumption:
To rebut that presumption, the unfairness of valuing property as of that date must be
evident and the difference in value must not be insignificant. In the vast majority of
cases, the date of service of summons will be the appropriate date for determining
valuation, and no judicial time need be expended in determining whether another date
would be more advantageous to one party or the other to some small degree.

id at 831 -32 (emphasis added). In the case at Bar, the trial court found that the application
of the service of summons date would be unfair solely because Jones and Barker were not
parties at the time summons was served on September 3, 1997. The court's ruling had
nothing whatsoever to due with the Friberg rationale where the market availability and
market value of the Friberg property was frozen for 7 years while UDOT litigated the
environmental aspects of 1-215 with other interests in federal court. The trial court did not
begin to find that use of the statutory valuation date in this case would result in unjust
compensation to the landowners. Even though lessees, partners and other similar interests
often enter a condemnation case after the date of service of summons of the record owner
and real party in interest, such late interventions do not entitle the interveners to an updated
valuation date. When the trial court determined that it would be "unfair" to Jones and
Barker to apply the September 3, 1997 date of service of summons and adjusted that date
to the date in which the trial judge happened to sign the order of intervention on August 13,
1998, such ruling not only violated the statutory mandate of § 78-34-11, it violated the
rationale of Friberg.
The second fundamental basis of the trial court's error was its determination that
Jones and Barker had due process rights which were violated by Davis County's failure to
name or serve them as having an interest in the Kerr Property. No authority was cited to
support the proposition that a conditional contract buyer has a due process right to be a party
to the condemnation action on the date of service of summons on the contract sellers. The
Legislative decision cannot be ignored by such an argument. Utah Department of Transp.
v. Walter M. Ogden and Sons, Inc., 805 P.2d 173, 175(Utah 1990) ("the condemnor is

entitled to a degree of certainty regarding the taking, including the date upon which
compensation must be assessed. This is the policy behind § 78-34-11 which deems the date
of valuation to be the date of service of summons."); Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake
City v. Mitsui Investment Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Utah 1974).
Jones and Barker did not have an interest in the Kerr Property that required Davis
County to name or serve them in the condemnation complaint.

All they had was a

contingent, conditional interest in a potential, unconsummated real estate purchase contract
that expired by its terms before they even became interveners in the case. Jones and Barker
had no right to possession, no legal title, and no recorded interest of any type, contract or
otherwise. One of the conditions to the Jones and Barker purchase of the Kerr Property was
approval by a governing authority of "commercial development." That condition could
never possibly be met. A potential unexercised option was the most that Davis County
believed that Jones and Barker possessed. The defendants, themselves, argued that the
agreements between Davis County, Farmington City, and PBA created a contractual
obligation on the part of Davis County to condemn the Kerr Property "which made
development of the property impossible." (R. at 926) The defendants further presented
evidence at trial that "on the date fixed for valuation, Mr. Kerr was holding [the property],"
"[Davis County] took away Mr. Kerr's ability to sell the property," Mr. Kerr "couldn't close
[on the contract with Jones and Barker] because of the condemnation" and "no actual
transactions involving the subject [property] have occurred." (R. at 1200, pp. 75, 78, 1201
p. 219, 1202 p. 485, Cook Appraisal (Ex. 73 at 4)) What is clear in all of the evidence is
that Jones and Barker had, at the utmost, an executory contract to purchase based on

conditions which never took place. Davis County clearly was not required to name Jones
and Barker in its complaint. The executory contract was not of record, no sale price had in
fact been paid, and a possession of the property remained with the owner, the Kerr Trust.
In State Road Comm. v. Valentine, 349 P.2d 321 (Utah 1960), a similar interest was
found non-compensable by the Supreme Court of Utah. In Valentine, the lessee of the
property under condemnation intervened in the action to claim damages for the unexpired
term of its lease with the property owner. The Court regarded such interest as "noncompensable" because at the time of the hearing on the State's motion for immediate
occupancy, the lessee only had an "executory contract for a lease":
At the time of hearing on motion for immediate occupancy, the instrument titled a
"lease" was nothing more than an executory contract for a lease, as yet unenforceable
as a lease, and hence non-compensable.
Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added). The facts with Jones and Barker are parallel to Valentine.
There had been no closing on the Jones/Barker Contract, and because of the failure of the
conditions under the executory agreement, it was not an enforceable contract as an
instrument of conveyance. Thus, Jones and Barker's alleged interest was not relevant in this
eminent domain action.
Even if Jones and Barker had a legitimate interest in the Kerr Property, their due
process rights were not violated. It is well established that in eminent domain cases,
"[p]ersonal notice is not an indispensable element of due process. It is sufficient if the
notice is of such a nature that it will probably apprise the owners of the proceedings. . . .
These principles stem from the unique character of a condemnation proceeding as one that
is in rem." 1A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 4.103[2] (Rev. 3rd ed. 2000); Dohanv v.

Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369(1930) ("The due process clause does not guarantee to the citizen
of a state any particular form or method of a state procedure. . . . Its requirements are
satisfied if he has reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present
his claim or defense.").
In this case, the Jones and Barker had actual notice of Davis County's action to
condemn the Kerr Property, even before summons was served on the owner. In fact both
Jones and Barker were present at the October 21, 1997 hearing on Davis County's motion
for immediate occupancy of the Kerr Property. (R. at 1195 p. 4.) "When it is shown that
an owner has actual knowledge of the taking, although he has not received formal notice,
courts will not be vigilant to protect his rights if he fails to appear at the hearing." Id. at §
4.103[3]; Town of Middleburg v. Steinmanor, 458 A.2d 393 (Conn. 1983).
Again, State Road Commission v. Valentine is controlling. There, the state had
instituted that case only against the fee owners of the property being condemned. It had not
included the company, Western Refining, which had entered into a lease for such property
after being "informed that a highway was going through the area." 349 P.2d at 321. At a
hearing on the government's motion for immediate occupancy, representatives of Western
Refining, one of which was a fee owner of the property and the other purporting to be his
attorney, were in attendance. Later, Western Refining joined the action to claim damages
for the unexpired term of its lease. The Utah Supreme Court held that by failing to disclose
its interest at the hearing on immediate occupancy, Western Refining was "estopped" to
pursue its claim:

If [the individuals in attendance] as [officers] of Western Refining intended to assert
any claim for damages for interference by the State with a ten-year lease, a full
disclosure of such intention should have been made at the hearing on the motion for
immediate occupancy. It is no answer, under the facts of this case, to say Western
Refining was not a party to the litigation at that time. By their silence they and the
company in which they were the two top officials were estopped because of nondisclosure. We believe it inconceivable that the trial court at said hearing would have
entered the conditional order it did . . . had the court known that before him were two
officials of a company that... later would attempt to claim damages for an unexpired
term of an unrecorded "lease" that, at the time of commencement of this action,
virtually was worthless.
Id. at 322 (emphasis added). Likewise, in this case Jones and Barker were in attendance at
the October 21,1997 hearing on Davis County's motion for immediate occupancy. Neither
these individuals nor the Kerr defendant indicated that Jones and Barker would seek to assert
their claimed interest in the action. To the contrary, Kerr defendant adduced evidence that
Max Kerr was the "[r]eal party in interest." (R. at 1194 p. 69.) At the very least, this Court
should view with intense incredulity Jones and Barker's claim that Davis County's failure
to include them deprived them of due process.
3.

The Erroneous Valuation Date Prejudiced Davis County in Nearly All
Aspects of this Condemnation Action.

Because an erroneous valuation date was used, defendants' expert took the various
sales prices of what he believed to be comparable sales and then inflated those prices at the
rate of one percent per month which substantially increased his valuation of the condemned
property. In addition, three of the five allegedly comparable sales defendants' appraiser
relied on occurred well after the September 3, 1997 service of summons date. Had the
service of summons date been applied, it would have been even more clear that they were

not comparable to the Kerr Property. At the very least, their sale prices would have had to
have been discounted to account for the appreciation in value over time.
The trial court's unprecedented decision to select the date alleged interest holders
were admitted in the action as the valuation date was erroneous and prejudicial. Therefore,
this Court should reverse the trial court's order setting August 13, 1998 as the valuation
date; establish the service of summons date, September 3, 1997, as the valuation date for
this case in accord with Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11; and remand for a new trial.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE COOK
APPRAISAL WHICH RELIED ON THE PROJECT FOR WHICH THE KERR
PROPERTY WAS CONDEMNED.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that any enhancement in value attributable

to the condemnation is not admissible to determine the fair market value of property in
eminent domain proceeds:
"We hold that in condemnation proceedings any enhancement . . . in value
attributable to the purpose for which the property is being condemned shall be
excluded in determining the fair market value of the property."
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Grutten 734 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1986). This
rule is grounded in good sense. "If a distinct tract is condemned, in whole or in part, other
lands in the neighborhood may increase in market value due to the proximity of the public
improvement erected on the land taken." United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376(1943).
It would be absurd and unfair to the condemnor to value the property to be condemned as
if it were adjacent thereto and a beneficiary of the condemnation. See Friberg, 687 P.2d at
830 n.8 ("A publicly announced general plan of area-wide condemnation may have the

effect of artificially increasing the value of properties not initially included in the area to be
condemned, thereby resulting in a windfall to the landowner.").
For example, in Grutter, the court upheld the exclusion of evidence offered by the
landowner of the value-enhancing aspects of the development adjacent to the condemned
property because that development was dependent on the condemnation. 734 P.2d at 435,
437. In United States v. Miller, the Court cited the following example:
[In] Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, . . . Congress . . . authorized
commissioners to establish a park along Rock Creek in the District of Columbia, and,
for that purpose, to select not exceeding two thousand acres of land. In 1891 the
commissioners prepared a map of the lands to be acquired, which was approved by
the President as required by statute. Proceedings were brought to condemn certain
tracts lying within the mapped area. The Supreme Court of the District instructed .
. . the triers of fact that they "shall receive no evidence tending to prove the prices
actually paid on sales of property similar to that included in said park, and so situated
as to adjoin it or be within its immediate vicinity, when such sales have taken place
since the passage of the act . . . authorizing said park . . ." The instruction was
approved by this court.
3 17 U.S. at 377-78.
In this case, defendants' sole valuation expert repeatedly violated the antienhancement rule to arrive at his $1.6 million appraisal. First, Cook selected as three of his
five "comparable" sales PBA's sales of parcels directly benefitted by the condemnation
action. Cook testified that these tracts were the most comparable to the Kerr Property and
gave their sales greater weight than the other two. Moreover, Cook refused to adjust the sale
prices downward to account for the benefits realized from use of the nearby Kerr Property
as a flood control basin, recreational open space, ecological preserve and for walking trails.
Indeed, Cook apparently ignored the fact that the condemnation of the Kerr Property and the
development which hinged on that condemnation had increased the value of the PBA lands

sold by over 450%. While PBA acquired the tracts for approximately $2 million, the
subsequent development, of which the condemnation was an integral part, enabled PBA to
sell the same lands for over $9 million. Defendants represented that two of the parcels Cook
relied on appreciated in value from between $10,000 and $40,000 an acre to between
$92,000 and $304,920 an acre "[o]nce [PBA] had an agreement with Davis County" for the
condemnation of the Kerr Property. (R. at 431-32.)
Courts uniformly find that evidence of such sales is inadmissible because it
unrealistically distorts the value of the properly under consideration. For example, the Utah
Supreme Court in Grutter upheld the exclusion of evidence offered by the landowner of the
value-enhancing aspects of the development adjacent to the condemned property because
that development was dependent on the condemnation. 734 P.2d at 435, 437.
In Board of County Commissioners of Eagle County v. Vail Associates, Ltd., 468
P.2d 842 (Colo. 1970)(en banc), the condemnor sought to condemn a strip of land for an
interstate highway, and the trial court permitted the condemnee's expert to value the strip
by reference to a sale of an adjacent parcel which closed after the highway project had been
announced. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial court committed prejudicial
error, necessitating a new trial:
We agree that this sale included an enhancement of land value as a direct result of the
highway improvement and, therefore, it becomes dissimilar for comparison purposes.
A landowner is not entitled to recover an increase or enhancement in value of his
land caused by the proposed improvement for which his land is being taken. Nor
should a landowner be entitled to indirectly increase the value of his land being taken
by comparing it with a sale of other land the value of which has been enhanced by
the public improvement contemplated.

Id. at 847 (citation omitted)(emphasis added); see also Latham Holding Co. v. State, 209
N.E.2d 542, 544 (N.Y. 1965) (overturning verdict and remanding for a new trial because
evidence of a sale of allegedly comparable land was admitted where the land had appreciated
in value as a result of the improvement for which the condemnation action was commenced);
State Highway Common v. Lacev, 113 N.W.2d50, 51-52 (S.D. 1962) ("Where the sale price
[of the alleged comparable land] reflects an important enhancement of value because of the
building of the interstate highway [for which the condemnation action is brought], the sale
is clearly not admissible."). Cook's reliance on sales of PBA's lands which had appreciated
in value as a direct result of the purpose for the condemnation action was improper, and
should have been excluded.
The other way in which Cook inflated his appraisal with the value-enhancing effects
of the condemnation of the Kerr Property is with respect to access. Cook opined that the
highest and best use of the Kerr Property was intensive commercial development. However,
Cook admitted that without the extension to the Kerr Property of Shepherd Creek Parkway,
which was constructed as part of PBA's development the Kerr Property would be
completely cut off from commercial traffic and hence unsuitable for commercial
development. To overcome this problem, Cook assumed that the parkway would have been
extended but for the condemnation of the Kerr Property.
What Cook refused to take into account however, is that but for the condemnation
of the Kerr Property for a flood control basin. Shepherd Creek Parkway would not have been
created in the first place. Cook even admitted that without the condemnation of the Kerr
Property, the parkway would not have been constructed in its current configuration. Thus,

by assuming that the parkway could provide commercial access to the Kerr Property. Cook
improperly considered the effects of the condemnation action. For these reasons, a new trial
should be ordered.
The admission of the Cook appraisal greatly prejudiced Davis County. Three out of
the five sales on which Cook relied were sales of PBA's tracts in the Farmington Preserve
project, and Cook gave such sales primary weight. Also, had the Shepard Creek Parkway
not been built, Cook would have had no basis to opine that intensive commercial
development was the highest and best use of the Kerr Property. Clearly, reliance on PBA's
development in the Farmington Preserve was what Cook used to justify his staggering
$1,606,500 appraisal, which the jury obviously adopted.
The Cook appraisal violated the holding of Grutter and should have been excluded
by the trial court. The trial court's refusal to do so prejudiced Davis County. For these
reasons, Davis County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's order
admitting the Cook appraisal into evidence and remand the case for a new trial.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN ADMITTING
INFLAMMATORY AND IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE THAT PBA WILL PAY THE
AMOUNT OF THE CONDEMNATION AWARD.
It is well settled that the source of payment in a condemnation action is irrelevant and,

if other than the condemnor, prejudicial:
'That the expenses incident to condemnation and the award itself are to be
paid by private parties is immaterial when the property thus being acquired .
. . is to be used for a public benefit, and . . . it [is] highly prejudicial for
members of the jury to be informed that someone other than the condemning
party would have to pay the verdict."

Nicrosi v. City of Montgomery, 406 So. 2d 951, 952-53 (Ala. Ct. App. 1981); see Southern
Elec. Generating Co. v. Leibacher, 110 So. 2d 308, 313-14 (Ala. 1959).
The Utah Supreme Court expressed agreement with this rule.

In State Road

Commission v. Woollev, 15 Utah 2d 248, 390 P.2d 860 (1964), the court noted that:
"[:]a juror did not already know" that an entity other than the condemnor
would pay the condemnation award, it would be unfairly prejudicial to
"suggest that [the entity] would pay for the property being taken and therefore,
perhaps, tried to make such juror more generous in his award than if he
believed the State would be solely responsible for payment."
Id. at 862.
The Utah Supreme Court also has "recognize[d] the potentially prejudicial effect
information of a defendant's wealth can have in a jury trial. As one scholar noted, c[R]ich
men do not fare well before juries, and the more emphasis placed on their riches, the less
well they fare."' Ong Int'l (U.S.A.I Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 456 (Utah
1993)(citing Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 1173, 1191
(193 1)); see also Deiavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222, 225 (Utah Ct. App.
1999) ("[Ejvidence of a party's wealth or financial condition is inadmissible until a finding
of liability for punitive damages has been made. This rule is intended to prevent juries from
being

improperly

influenced

by a party's wealth

in assessing

compensatory

damages-damages which should be assessed based solely on losses, not the losing party's
ability to pay"). Where a jury was exposed to information that a defendant was a wealthy
foreign corporation, the Utah Supreme Court held that "the defendant was not accorded a
fair trial and that the issues should be submitted to another jury." Anderson v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 107 Utah 20, 151 P.2d 465, 467 (1944).

In this case, the jury was repeatedly told by defense counsel that PBA will pay the
condemnation award. With reference to multi-million dollar land sales and without concern
for the capital and effort expended to develop the land, defense counsel also portrayed PBA
as a wealthy non-party.
In this context PBA's position is no different than a liability insurer providing
coverage for a defendant in a personal injury case. Just as it would be error to admit
evidence of liability insurance in the personal injury case, it was error for the trial court in
this case to admit evidence of PBA's indemnification of Davis County. Hill v. Cloward, 14
Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186, 187 (1962) ("It seems hardly necessary to state that the matter of
insurance is quite immaterial to issues as to liability and damages, or the amount thereof").
The admission of this evidence "affected the outcome of the proceedings." Verde,
770 P.2d at 120; State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987); Beldan v. Dalbo. Inc.. 752
P.2d 1317, 1319, 1321 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Utah R. Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61.
With the admission of this evidence, the jury was left to conclude that it could be free with
the money of a wealthy non-party. The evidence that a private party will pay the award may
also have induced the jury to believe that there was no public necessity for the
condemnation, contrary to the stipulation that there was a public necessity for it, and to
award what they believed to be the amount defendants would accept for a private sale of the
Kerr Property, the $1.6 million they requested.
In denying Davis County's motion for new trial the trial court suggested that Davis
County waived its objection to this evidence by not objecting to it at trial. Davis County,
however, had no opportunity to object at trial before the jury was first exposed to the

irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. Defense counsel interrupted Davis County's opening
statement to inform the jury that "[Davis County is] not paying for this property, the
developer is." (R. at 1200 p. 17.)
Moreover, Davis County adequately preserved its objection in a motion in limine
which, in a written order prepared by defendants' counsel, was definitively "denied." (R.
at 599.) "[W]hen an issue is argued before the court and the court makes a definitive ruling,
as is the case here, the issue is adequately preserved." Salt Lake City v. Holtman, 806 P.2d
235, 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989); State v.
Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989); State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)).
"[T]o require an additional objection at trial following a pretrial motion to suppress, simply
to preserve the issue for appeal would be absurd," and "where legitimate trial strategy
dictates that [the] party opposing admission of evidence loses [its] pre-trial motion and then
proffers the evidence at trial, [its] objection is preserved." Id (citing American Home Assur.
Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket Inc., 753 F.2d 321 (3rd Cir. 1985); United States v. Cook, 608
F.2d 1175, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978)).
Davis County had no obligation to proceed as if the trial court's order did not exist and call
the jury's attention to and thereby emphasize such evidence by renewing its objection.
The trial court, however, suggested that its written order definitively "den[ying]"
Davis County's motion meant that it was "deferring" a ruling on the issue until trial. The
trial court pointed to oral statements it made during the hearing on Davis County's motion
to support its position.

Utah law is clear, however, that regardless of the language used during the hearing,
the language of the final written order controls. Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177 (Utah 1998);
Matter of Estate of Leone, 860 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (written orders are subject
to the same rules as written contracts). The trial court's written order clearly "denied'' Davis
County's motion to exclude evidence of PBA's indemnification of Davis County.
Importantly, if the court wanted to defer a ruling on the motion, it could have easily stated
as much, as it did with respect to other issues which were expressly "deferred" until trial.
Also, the trial court's oral statements during the hearing indicated, at least to counsel
for defendants who prepared the written order, that trial court was not deferring a ruling
until trial. Defendants' counsel were likely influenced by the trial court's statements that
"I'm not going to say that [evidence of PBA's indemnification of Davis County is] going
to be excluded, that they can't do it" and that "I'm not allowing them to exclude that [PBA]
has nothing to do with this." (R. at 1199 pp. 60-61.) Whether influenced by these or some
other statements of the court, defendants' counsel obviously believed, as did Davis County,
that the trial had definitively "denied" Davis County's objection. He prepared the order
expressly and unequivocally stating as much.
Evidence of PBA's payment of the condemnation award was improper and
prejudicial to Davis County. Davis County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court's order admitting such evidence and remand the case for a new trial in which such
inflammatory evidence is excluded.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED BY SELECTING A LEGALLY
ERRONEOUS DATE FROM WHICH TO CALCULATE PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST.
The prejudgment interest date is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9, which states

that the judgment in a condemnation action "shall include, as part of the compensation
awarded, interest . . . from the date of taking actual possession thereof by the plaintiff or
order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment."
In this case, the trial court calculated prejudgment interest from the date of the first
order of immediate occupancy, October 31, 1997. This was incorrect because the trial court
effectively struck this order to allow Jones and Barker to challenge Davis County's right to
occupancy.

Even defendants' counsel recognized that the first order of immediate

occupancy was "void." (R. at 1198 pp. 9-10, 35.)
The date from which interest is calculated should have been March 8, 1999, the date
of the stipulation entitling Davis County to immediate occupancy. As defendants argued to
the trial court, this was "the date on which [Davis County's] right to condemn the [defendant
and] interveners' property was finally established." (R. at 249.) Also, Davis County did not
take possession of the Kerr Property until after March 8, 1999. Defendants admitted this as
well: "there was no possessory act until following the order of immediate occupancy of
March of 1999." (R. at 1198 p. 3.) Thus, as defendants themselves argued to the trial court,
"Given the fact that interest cannot be taxed in this case until the earliest of actual possession
or the date of occupancy, interest cannot begin to run until March 8th, 1999." (R. at 1198
p. 9.) Davis County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling
establishing October 31, 1997 as the date from which interest will be calculated.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN REFUSING TO
CONSIDER AN AFFIDAVIT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHING DAVIS
COUNTY'S KNOWLEDGE OF JONES AND BARKER'S INTEREST IN THE
KERR PROPERTY AT THE TIME DAVIS COUNTY FILED ITS
COMPLAINT.
The trial court erred in refusing to consider the affidavit offered by Davis County to

explain the degree of its knowledge of Jones and Barker's alleged interest in the Kerr
Property at the time the action was initiated. The trial court's selection of an August 13,
1998 valuation date was based in large part on its assumption that Davis County believed
that Jones and Barker had a legitimate ownership interest in the Kerr Property. There was
no basis for that assumption, and, in fact, Davis County had continually questioned whether
Jones and Barker had any cognizable interest in the Kerr Property. Moreover, the trial court
refused to consider Davis County's affidavit setting forth its understanding of Jones and
Barker's alleged interest. Thus, the trial court assumed without any basis that Davis County
believed Jones and Barker had an ownership interest in the Kerr Property and then refused
to allow Davis County an opportunity to set the record straight. In this way, the trial court
acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
CONCLUSION
There is only one conclusion that can be drawn from the manifest error committed
in this case. Davis County was plainly denied a fair trial in the condemnation of the Kerr
Property.
The trial court permitted and then participated in a manipulation and rigging of the
valuation date and the comparable market data and opinion evidence based upon enhanced
values generated by the project for which the Kerr Property was condemned. When added

to the inflammatory comments about the source of payment of the condemnation award, the
result was a jury verdict unsupported by competent and admissible evidence and based upon
a valuation date altered from that which the Legislature, itself, has declared.
The miscalculation of interest is but an added facet to a judgment that cannot be
permitted, in the manifest interest of justice, to stand.
The judgment of the trial court must be reversed and set aside and a new trial ordered
and mandated, it is most
Respectfully submitted,

^

&L*£ji^> *

\&>.

ROBERT S. CAMPBI
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy
Special Deputy Davis County Attorney
CHRIS R. HOGLE
Berman Gaufin Tomsic Savage & Campbell
Special Deputy Davis County Attorney
GERALD E. HESS
Davis County Attorney's Office

Dated: June 6, 2001.
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

lis i$ a legally binding contract Utah law requires n»al estate llc«nsees to us» this form. Buyer and Seller, however, may agree to alter or
l
let8 its provisions or to use a different form. If you desire legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax advisor

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
uyer
/tft*
HK^^c
* * J f t O L g .JZ^CfJkJS.
offers to purchase the Property
low and h&reby,delivers
ascribed below
h&^by,delivers to the brokerage,
Brokerage, as Earnest Money, the amount of $
/'/frtZs?
in the form of
4&rtrf£**^r c"A which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as defined in Section 23). shall be
eposired in accordance with state law
eceived by:
Phone Number
OFFER TO PURCHASE
. PROPERTY:
&€*& <<S //<?&> < v
Iso described a>fc* / ^ / r ^ ^ ^ f e y 7 ^ / ^
)ity of
jiZ^j^xy X.
. County of

/^s^s^y^c*S
JO</>**•*>>.

*Ss
, State of Utah (the "Property").

Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if presently attached to the Property
lumbing. heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in appliances; light fixtures and bulbs
athroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows: window blinds; awnings
istalled television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets; automatic garage door opener and
iccompanying transmitter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall also be included in this sale and conveyed
mder separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title:
1.2

Excluded Items. The following items are excluded from this sale:

J?s+**<-

1.3

Water Rights. The following water rights are included in this sale:

jtSsu-^r

1.4
Survey. A survey map of the Property certified by a licensed surveyor [ ] WILL [ X WILL NOT be prepared. The
Property comers [ ] WILL Jp^WlLL NOT be marked by survey stakes set by a licensed surveyor or engineering company. The
:ost of the applicable items chetked above will be: [ ] paid by Buyer [ ] paid by Seller [ ] shared equally by Buyer and
Seller [ ] Other (specify)
For additional terms, see attached Survey Addendum if applicable.
2.

PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for the Property is $ _
2.1

Method of PaymenL The Purchase Price will be paid as follows:

/£*€%?
y
^
_ _

$
$
$

ty$rp

7S1ZS

pS, £C7J
*

^3(f

&&*>

Tagc I I h p.igci

(a) Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described In this Contract, THIS DEPOSIT
MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE.
(b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new loan as provided in Section 2.3 Buyer will apply for
one or more of the following loans: [ ] CONVENTIONAL [ ] FHA [ J VA
I ] OTHER (specify)
If an FHAA/A loan applies, see attached FHA/VA Loan Addendum.
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and give details:
t ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS
_
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

Loan Assumption (see attached Assumption Addendum if applicable)
Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable)
Other (specify)
Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement

PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (f)

Seller's Initials '(AA ^

Date *> ^J\

- ^ 1 Buyer's Initials^

-A

2.2
(a)
(b)

2.3
(a)

(b)

Financing Condition, (check applicable box)
[ J Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable loan(s)
referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (c) (the "Loan"). This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition '
[ ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan Section 2 3
does not apply.
Application for Loan.
Buyer's duties. No later than the Application Deadline referenced in Section 24(a), Buyer shall apply for the Loan.
"Loan Application"occurs only when Buyer has: (i) completed, signed, and delivered to the lender (the "Lender") the
initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender; and (ii) paid all loan application fees as required by
the Lender. Buyer agrees to diligently'work to obtain the Loan. Buyer will promptly provide the Lender with any
additional documentation as required by the Lender.
Procedure if Loan Application is denied. If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender does not
approve the Loan (a "Loan Denial4), Buyer shall, no later than three calendar days thereafter, provide a copy to Seller.
Buyer or Seller may, within three calendar days after Se!ler=s receipt of such notice, cancel this Contract by providing
written notice to the other party. In the event of a cancellation under this Section 2.3(b): (i) if the Loan Denial was
received by Buyer on or before the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline referenced in Section 24(d). the Earnest
Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer: (ii) if the Loan Denial was received by Buyer after the Earnest Money
Forfeiture Deadline. Buyer agrees to forfeit, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy, the Earnest
Money as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on the
Financing Condition set forth in Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this
Contract shall be governed by such other provisions.

2.4
Appraisal of Property. Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property [ ] IS £ t f IS NOT conditioned upon the Property
appraising for not less than the Purchase Price. If the appraisal condition applies and tnfe Property appraises for (ess than the
Purchase Pnce. Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days!after Buyer's
receipt of notice of the appraised value. In the event of such cancellation, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer,
regardless of whether such cancellation is before or after the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline. A failure to cancel as provided in
this Section 2.4 shall be deemed a waiver of the appraisal condition by Buyer.
SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Settlement shall take place on or before the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section
24(e). ASettlement" shall occur only when all of the following have been completed: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and
delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow
instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these documents (except for the proceeds of
any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds; and
(c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under these documents have been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the
escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1/2) of the fee charged by
the escrow/closing office for its services in the settlement/closing process. Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and
interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated at Settlement as set forth in this Section. Tenant deposits (including, but not
limited to. security deposits, cleaning deposits and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement.
Prorations set forth in this Section shall be made as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(e). unless otherwise
agreed to in writing by the parties. Such writing could include the settlement statement The transaction will be considered closed
when Settlement has been completed, and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have
been delivered by the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/closing office; and (ii) the applicable Closing documents have been
recorded in the office of the county recorder. The actions described in parts (i) and (ii) of the preceding sentence shall be
completed within four calendar days of Settlement
4.
POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within^J/G
[ ] Other (specify)

.Arbours [

]

days after Closing;

S.
CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract:
[ r / ^ l
] Seller's Initials
[
1 Buyer's Initials,
The Listing Agent.
Selling Agent.

S

/ ^ ^ A ^ L ^ ^ S ^ ^ - i ^ ^ ^
~ ~ I ~ > 7 / O

represents [ ] SellerJ>LBuyer M , both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent;

y ^ ^ ^
^ ^ / ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ A T
' ^ «-ZP^
"

representor^Seller [ ] Buyer j > $ both Buyer and Seller
aa a Limited Agent;
Aaent*
as
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Seller's Initials_ A{

. ^

Date S/zt/?7

Buyer's Initials.

A

ie Listing Broker.

_

firf
y

, Selling Broker,

S^sfjj?

£

, represents [ ] S e l l e r p ' ^ u y e r ^ ^ b o t h Buyer and Seller
as a
rff^
Limited Agent;

7

&n S*»A

^W"?
^^

, representy^Seller [ ] B u y e p f ^ b o t h Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent;

TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, Seller agrees to pay for a standard-coverage owner's policy of title insurance insuring
uyer in the amount of the Purchase Price
SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b). Seller shall provide to
uyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures":
0 a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller;
)) a commitment for the policy of title insurance;
:) a copy of any leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing;
J) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or zoning code
violations; and
5) Other (specify)
.
BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purchase under this
;ontract (check applicable boxes):
»^JS
[ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7;
] IS
£>4J£ NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property;
>4JS
[ ] IS NOT auditioned upon Buyers approval of the following tests and evaluations of the Property: (specify)
any of the above items are checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not apply. The
ems checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the "Evaluations & Inspections." Unless otherwise provided in
vs Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by individuals or entities of Buyer's
hoice. Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the walk-through inspection under Section 11.
8.1
Period for Completion and Review of Evaluations and Inspections. No later than the Buyer Cancellation Deadline
jrenced in Section 24(c) Buyer shall: (a) complete all Evaluations & inspections; and (b) determine if the Evaluations &
inspections are acceptable to Buyer.
8.2
Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable, Buyer may. no
ater than the Buyer Cancellation Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller, whereupon the
Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections.
8.3
Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Buyer Cancellation Deadline. Buyer does not: (a) cancel this Contract
as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections, the Evaluations &
nspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer.
8.4
Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar days
after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period*') in which to agree in writing upon the manner of resolving
3uyefs objections. Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyers objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in
anting upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no
ater than three calendar days after expiration of the Response Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to
Buyer, regardless of whether such cancellation is before or after the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline. If this Contract is not
:anceled by Buyer under this Section 8.4. Buyer's objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those
items warranted in Section 10.
9.
ADDITIONAL TERMS. There N ^ A R E [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms. If there are.
the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference: £ ^ A d d e n d u m No.
/
m
[ ] Survey Addendum K d Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum
[ ] Lead-Based Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by law)
[ ] Other (specify)
.
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Seller's Initials

/\A \\JX

Date /

^

'Q\

Buyer's Initials ^Ir^Vf)

Date 7 " n " 7 7

10.

SELLER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS.
10.1
Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property and will convey good and marketable title
Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed, unless the sale is being made pursuant to a real estate contract which provides for
.e to pass at a later date, in that case, title will be conveyed in accordance with the provisions of that contract. Buyer agrees,
however, to accept title to the Property subject to the following matters of record: easements, deed restrictions. CC&R's (meaning
covenants, conditions and restrictions), and rights-of-way; and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as
agreed to by Buyer under Section 8 Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and
not expiring prior to Closing. Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and
other services provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1(c).
Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and warrants. Seller
will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners association dues.
10.2
Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will be in the following condition ON THE DATE SELLER
OELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
(a)
the Property shall be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant moving-related
damage to the Property shall be repaired at Seller's expense:
(b)
the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances and fireplaces will be
in working order and fit for their intended purposes;
(c)
the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller;
(d)
any pnvate well or septic tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, and shall be in working order and fit
for its intended purpose; and
(e)
the Property and improvements, including the landscaping, will be in the same general condition as they were on the
date of Acceptance.
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement. Buyer may. upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time, conduct
a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is - as represented," meaning thfat the items
referenced in Sections 1 1. 8.4 and 10.2 ("the items") are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed, and in tfee warranted
condition. If the items are not as represented. Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or repair the items or, with the
consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same. The failure to conduct a
Ik-through inspection, or to claim that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a waiver by Buyer of the right to receive,
, the date of possession, the items as represented.
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none of the
following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made; (b) no new
leases shall be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or undertaken; and (d) no
further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made.
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or other
entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and Seller.
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, constitutes
the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties,
understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties.
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract
[ J SHALL fcd M A Y (upon mutual agreement of the parties) first be submitted to mediation. If the parties agree to mediation, the
dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to
bear its own costs of mediation. If mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract shall apply.
Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation.
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults. Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to return
it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Seller defaults. In addition to
return of the Earnest Money Deposit. Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit as
liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Buyer
elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. It is agreed that denial
^ a Loan Application made by the Buyer is not a default and is governed by Section 2.3(b).
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Date
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Date
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17.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.
17.1
In Actions to Enforce this Contract. In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the
mailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. Attorney fees shall not be awarded for participation in
mediation under Section 15.
17.2
In Interpleader Actions. If a principal broker holding the Earnest Money Deposit ts required by law to file an
interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over that Deposit, Buyer and Seller authorize that principal broker to draw from that
Deposit an amount necessary to advance the court costs needed to bring that interpleader action. The amount of the Deposit
remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court. Buyer and Seller further agree that whichever of them is
found to be in default may be ordered to pay any reasonable attorney fees, or additional court costs, incurred by the principal
broker in bringing the action, unless the court finds that there was fault on the part of the principal broker or his or her agent that
would make such an award of attorney fees and costs unjust.
18. NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, all notices required under this Contract must be: (a) in writing; (b) signed by the
party giving notice; and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable date referenced in this
Contract
19. ABROGATION. Except for the provisions of Sections 15 and 17.1 and express warranties made in this Contract, the
provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing.
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property not caused by Seller or Buyer, including physical damage or destruction to the
Property or its improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall
be borne by Seller until Seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer.
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract. Extensions must be
agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract: (a) performance under each Section of this
Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date; and!(o) the term
*daysH shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers the timing
^uirement (j e Acceptance, receipt of the Seller Disclosures, etc.). Performance dates and times referenced herein shall not be
ding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed to in writing
oy such non-party.
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any addenda
and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original. This Contract and any
addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts.
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) signs the
offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other party's agent that
the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.
24.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract:
Application Deadline
No later than i£> calendar days after Acceptance.
Seller Disclosure Deadline
No later than ££> calendar days after Acceptance.
Buyer Cancellation Deadline
No later than Jt^L calendar days after Buyer's receipt of all of the
Seller Disclosures.
Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline
afj2^calendar days after the^Buyer Cancellation Deadline.
Settlement Deadline
fSO
&£**
/ > * ^ /L»>Zrx(DATE)

25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms ana conditio
does not accept this offer by: / \ J AM JpQ PM Mountain Time
^ f s ^ *?~12
ffi
. 19^2_
shall lapse; spd the Brpkerage shall returrUhe Earnest Money Depict toJJuysr. J
*
/
(Buyer's S i g n a l )

(Offer Date)
The later of th« above Offer Dates shall be reftrrtd to aa the "Offer Reference Date"

.uyers* Names) (PLEASE PRINT)
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Buyer's Initials
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^cLLER FINANCING ADDENDUM

.ton®

JQ

M

-°'^ n

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
. rilS SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM is made a part of that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
an Offer Reference Date of
¥~Af
. 19 ^ 7 between 72^/'ff***^
/
^2**>/
/Z*r£**s
as Buyer, and
/7?A< /fvfV
^^ (/
^ / a s Seller, regarding the
Property located at
fr*~g
/ V //&-& Cj
/&**?£~
/¥.££&&&
The terms of this ADDENDUM are hereby
incorporated as part of the REPC.
1. CREDIT DOCUMENTS. Seller's extension of credit to Buyer shall be evidenced by: [ * 1 Note and Deed of Trust
[ ] Note and All-inclusive Deed of Trust [ f Other:
CREDIT TERMS. The terms of the credit documents referred to in Section 1 above are as follows:
prinp$al amount of the note (the "Note"); interest at
&
% per annum; payable at approximately S
^
yV^l
The entire unpaid balance of principal plus accrued interest is due in / ^ r months from
date of the Note. ^iTs/paymentdue $£> *^ *&* C^^Additional principal payments, balloon payments or other terms as
follows
/ * / / ****.
fH*~y»^A ">x^ JfciJC^r r?7-+^ /h***-*-!-*
d?***" /t^y^i^rr

The credit documents referenced in Section 1 of this ADDENDUM will contain a due-on-sale clause in favor of Seller. Seller
agrees to provide to Buyer at Settlement: (a) an amortization schedule based on the above terms; (b) a written disclosure of
the total interest Buyer will pay to maturity of the Note; and (c) the annual percentage rate on the Note based on loan closing
costs
3. TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. In addition to the payments referenced in Section 2 above. Buyer shall also be
responsible for (a) property taxes, (b) homeowners association dues; (c) special assessments: and (d) hazard insurance
oremiums on the Property These obligations will be paid: ^ \ directly to Seller/Escrow Agent on a monthly basts [ 1
>ctly to the applicable county treasurer, association, and insurance company as required by those entities.
4. PAYMENT. Buyer's payments under Sections 2 and 3 above will be made to: ^ Seller [ ] an Escrow Agent. If an
Escrow Agent,
will act as Escrow Agent and will be responsible for disbursing payments on
any underlying mortgage or deed of trust (the "underlying mortgage") and to the Seller. Cost of setting up the escrow account
shall be paid by: [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller [ ] split evenly between the parties.
5. LATE PAYMENT/PREPAYMENT. Any payment not made within _ / £ days after it is due is subject to a late charge
of $
5Z)
or i T " % of the installment due. whichever is greater. Amounts in default shall bear interest at a rate
of
^
% per annum. All or part of the principal balance on the Note may be paid prior to maturity without penalty.
6. DUE-ON-SALE. As part of the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7 of the REPC. Seller shall provide to Buyer a
copy of the underlying mortgage, the note secured thereby, and the amortization schedule. Buyer's obligation to purchase
under this Contract is conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of those documents, in accordance with Section 8 of
the REPC. If the holder of the underlying mortgage calls the loan due as a result of this transaction. Buyer agrees to
discharge the underlying loan as required by the mortgage lender. In such event. Seller's remaining equity shall be paid as
provided in the credit documents.
7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provided to Seller, as a required part of this ADDENDUM, the attached Buyer
Financial Information Sheet. Buyer may use the Buyer Financial Information Sheet approved by the Real Estate Commission
and the Attorney General's Office, or may provide comparable written information in a different format, together with such
additional information as Seller may reasonably require. Buyer [ ] WILL£<] WILL NOT provide Seller with copies of IRS
returns for the two preceding tax years. Buyer acknowledges that Seller may contact Buyers current employer for verification
of employment as represented by Buyer in the Buyer Financial Information Sheet.
R.

SELLER APPROVAL. By the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) of the REPC. Buyer shall provide
teller at Buyer's expense, a current credit report on Buyer from a consumer credit reporting agency. Seller may use the
..edit report and the information referenced in Section 7 of this Addendum ("Buyer Disclosures") to evaluate the creditworthiness of Buysr.

P « ^ I of 2 fiH*es

Seller's Initials / V l l/.

Date < ^ - % 1 — <r/fluytr's Initials

8.1
Seller Review. By the Buy^ Jancellation Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC. Seller shall review
he credit report and the Buyer Disclosures to determine if the content of the credit report, and the Buyer Disclosures is
acceptable. If the content of the credit report or the Buyer Disclosures is not acceptable to Seller, Seller may elect to either
^) provide written objections to Buyer as provided in Section 8.2 of this ADDENDUM; or (b) immediately cancel the REPC by
ovidmg written notice to Buyer by the Buyer Cancellation Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC. The
brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Seller's written notice of cancellation, shall return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit.
8.2
Seller Objections. If Seller does not immediately cancel the REPC as provided above. Seller may, by the Buyer
Cancellation Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC. provide Buyer with written objections. Buyer and Seller shall
nave seven calendar days after Buyer's receipt of the objections (the "Response Period") in which to agree in writing upon
:he manner of resolving Seller's objections. Buyer may. but shall not be required to, resolve Seller's objections. If Seller and
Buyer have not agreed m writing upon the manner of resolving Seller's objections, Seller may cancel the REPC by providing
written notice to Buyer no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response Period. The Brokerage, upon
receipt of a copy of Seller's written notice of cancellation, shall return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit, regardless of
whether such cancellation is before or after the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline.
8.3
Failure to Object If Seller does not deliver a written objection to Buyer regarding the credit report or a Buyer
Disclosure by the Buyer Cancellation Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC or cancel the REPC as provided in
Sections 8.1 or 8 2 of this ADDENDUM, the credit report and Buyer Disclosures will be deemed approved by Seller.
9. TITLE INSURANCE. Buyer [ ] S H A L L A / ] SHALL NOT provide to Seller a lender's policy of title insurance in the
amount of the indebtedness to the Seller, and snathpay for such policy at Settlement
10. DISCLOSURE OF TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS. By no later than the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section
24(e) of the REPC. Buyer and Seller shall disclose to each other below their respective Social Security Numbers or other
applicable tax identification numbers so that they may comply with federal laws on reporting mortgage interest in filings with
the internal Revenue Service.
i

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC. including all prbr addenda
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, not
modified by this ADDENDUM
NDU^I shall
shal[remain
remain the same. ^<l.Seller
J>4.Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until
/
[ ] AM J x l PM
< ^ ^ y * ^ P ~ 5 ^ 2 ^ 7 1 9 5 0 . to accept these terms in accordance with
Section 23 of the REPC.
itfi S
'ountain Time
Is offer shall lapse. fi£>
lless so accepted, this
ji^l§uyer[

[Seller
Signage
Seller Signat^i

Date

[ ^ Buyer (

Seller Signature

Date

Time

^QftftH
Time

Social Security Number

*7A-4&~ 74&?h
Social Security NunrfGer

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
^><£^CCEPTANCE:
[

J COUNTEROFFER:
ADDENDUM NO.

(Signature)
[

~jUafc*~~

[ ] Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts these terms.
[ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms set forth on the attached

/ S £ ^ —

( Date > ( T i m e >

(Signature)

(Date) (Time)

(Signature)

(Date) (Time)

]REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects these terms.

(Date) (Time)

(Signature)

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
EFFECTIVE JUNE 12, 1996. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.

Q « l l ^ < Inltifll%^ / VV

U

Date

Buyer's Initials.

<?#$>«. *t>-n

FIRST ADDENDUM TO REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
This constitutes the First Addendum to that certain REAL ESTATE PURCHASE
CONTRACT (the "Agreement") dated April 30, 1997, by and between Max Ken* "Seller"
and Tod B. Jones and Paul Barker or assigns, as "Buyer".
The following terms and conditions'are hereby incorporated as part of the Agreement:
1. Contingencies. This Offer is subject to the satisfaction of the following contingencies:
a.
Buyer obtaining to Buyer's satisfaction approval from any governing
authorities having jurisdiction over the development of the property. Buyers
approval of the onsite and offsite improvements required by the municipal
authorities.
b.
The site is free from soil contamination of any kind.
c.
Buyer obtaining to Buyer's satisfaction approval from the Army Corp of
Engineers to use and develop the site. The above approval is specifically
regarding wetlands issues on the site.
d.
Seller will cooperate with Buyer to facilitate a tax free exchange.
2.

Extension of Closing Date. Buyer may extend the Closing Date ninety (90) days
by paying a non-refundable deposit of $3,000.

3.

Buyer is a licensed real estate agent.

4.

Liquidated Damages and Limitation of Remedies. In the event the buyer fails,
without legal excuse, to complete the purchase of the property, the earnest money
deposit, and any payments then made by the Buyer shall be forfeited to the
Seller as the sole and exclusive remedy available to the Seller for such failure.

Buyer:

Tod B^Jpney^

Paul Barker

Savon*

ZZJPJ*
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EMINENT DOMAIN
C.J.S. - 29AC.J.S. Eminent Domain § 96 et
seq.
A.L.R. — Evidentiary effect of view by jury in
condemnation case, 1 A.L.R.3d 1397.
Use or improvement of highway as establishing grade necessary to entitle abutting owner to
compensation on subsequent change, 2
A.L.R.3d 985.
Valuation at time of original wrongful entry
by condemner or at time of subsequent initiation of condemnation proceedings, 2 AX.R.3d
1038.
Restrictive covenant or right to enforcement
thereof as compensable property right, 4
A.L.R.3d 1137.
Depreciation in value, from project for which
land is condemned, as factor in fixing compensation, 5 A.L.R.3d 901.
Zoning as factor in determination of damages
in eminent domain, 9 A.L.R.3d 291.
How to obtain a jury trial in eminent domain:
waiver, 12 A.L.R.3d 7.
Admissibility of hearsay evidence as to comparable sales of other land as basis for expert's
opinion as to land value, 12 A.L.R.3d 1064.
Deduction of benefits in determining compensation or damages in proceedings involving
opening, widening, or otherwise altering highway, 13 A.L.R.3d 1149.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of argument or evidence as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 17
A.L.R.3d 1449.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of argument or evidence as to source of
funds to pay for property, 19 A.L.R.3d 694.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Propriety and effect of argument or evidence
as to financial status of parties in eminent
domain proceeding, 21 A.L.R.3d 936.
Existence of restrictive covenant as element
in fixing value of property condemned, 22
A.L.R.3d 961.
Admissibility, on issue of value of condemned
real property, of rental value of other real
property, 23 A.L.R.3d 724.
Admissibility of photographs or models of
property condemned, 23 A.L.R.3d 825.
Cost of substitute facilities as measure of

78-34-11

compensation paid to state or municipality for
condemnation of public property, 40 A.L.R.3d
143.
Measure and elements of damage for limitation of access caused by conversion of conventional road into limited-access highway, 42
A.L.R.3d 148.
Measure of damages for condemnation of
cemetery lands, 42 A.L.R.3d 1314.
Traffic noise and vibration from highway as
element of damages in eminent domain, 51
A.L.R.3d 860.
Condemned property's location in relation to
proposed site of building as factor in fixing
compensation, 51 A.L.R.3d 1050.
Loss of liquor license as compensable in condemnation proceeding, 56 A.L.R.3d 581.
Goodwill or "going concern" value as element
of lessee's compensation for taking leasehold in
eminent domain, 58 A.L.R.3d 581.
Compensation for diminution in value of the
remainder of property resulting from taking or
use of adjoining land of others for the same
undertaking, 59 A.L.R.3d 488.
Consideration of fact that landowner's remaining land will be subject to special assessment as factor in fixing compensation, 59
A.L.R.3d 534.
Condemner's
liability
for
costs
of
condemnee's expert witnesses, 68 A.L.R.3d 546.
Right in eminent domain proceeding to call
as witness expert engaged but not called as
witness by opposing party, 71 A.L.R.3d 1119.
Determination of just compensation for condemnation of billboards or other advertising
signs, 73 AX.R.3d 1122.
Eminent domain: unity or contiguity of separate properties sufficient to allow damages for
diminished value of parcel remaining after taking of other parcel, 59 A.L.R.4th 308.
Validity, construction, and effect of statute or
lease provision expressly governing rights and
compensation of lessee upon condemnation of
leased property, 22 A.L.R.5th 327.
Measure of damages or compensation in eminent domain as affected by premises being
restricted to particular educational, religious,
charitable, or noncommercial use, 29 A.L.R.5th
36.
Key Numbers. — Eminent Domain ®=> 122
et seq.

78-34-11. When right to damages deemed to have accrued.
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto
shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its
actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken,
but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are allowed, as
provided in Section 78-34-10. No improvements put upon the property subse585

78-34-11

JUDICIAL CODE

quent to the date of service of summons shall be included in the assessment of
compensation or damages.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-11; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 170.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Sec-

tion 78-34-10" for "the next preceding section"
in the first sentence.
Cross-References. — Service of summons,
Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Date of accrual.
— Interest on award.
— Value and damages.
Evidence of value.
— Comparable sales.
— Potential development.
— Rents.
— Subsequent improvements.
Purpose of section.
— Prevention of damage enhancement.
Date of accrual.
— Interest on award.
Where the owners of property condemned for
railroad purposes remained in possession and
had the use of the property until the final order
of condemnation, the service of summons was
not a "taking" of the property, and hence they
were not entitled to interest on the assessment
of condemnation from the date of the service of
summons to verdict, less rents and other benefits of possession received by them during that
period. Oregon Short line R.R. v. Jones, 29
Utah 147, 80 P. 732 (1905).
In suit by abutting owner to recover consequential damages to real property caused by
change in street grade by city, plaintiff was
entitled to recover interest on damages from
time of completion of grade injuring property.
Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 90 P.
395, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.) 483, 125 Am. St. R. 859
(1907).
In action by railroad to condemn certain strip
of ground used for school purposes to be used
for railroad, interest on damages for land condemned should have been computed from time
railroad took possession of land, and not from
date of judgment. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R. v.
Board of Educ, 35 Utah 13, 99 P. 263 (1909).
In eminent domain proceeding, interest on
award should not be computed from date of
commencement of action, but rather from date
of order of occupancy. Salt Lake & U.R.R. v.
Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 P. 90 (1920).
Interest is recoverable only from the time of
taking possession of the property and not from
the commencement of the action. State v. Peek,
1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 (1953).
—Value and damages.
If condemnation proceedings are instituted

against trustee in deed of trust and summons is
served upon him, and afterwards real owners
enter their appearance and waive summons,
the measure of damages is value of land at time
of entry of appearance, and not at date of
summons issued against trustee. Oregon S.L. &
U.N. Ry. v. Mitchell, 7 Utah 505, 27 P. 693
(1891).
In proceeding by railroad to condemn land,
trial court properly fixed date that landowner's
counsel entered voluntary appearance in open
court which amounted to general appearance
as time for determining the value of land taken
and the damages to the portion not taken.
Ogden L. & I. Ry. v. Jones, 51 Utah 62, 168 P.
548 (1917).
In condemnation of water right of way, value
and damages should be measured as of time of
service of summons, subject to proof that value
or damages, either or both, have been lost as
result of the condemnation. Hyde Park Town v.
Chambers, 99 Utah 118, 104 P2d 220 (1939).
If farm land similar to that taken is not
available at time of trial, but was available on
date summons was served, no severance damages based on theory that farm was a unit
operation can be awarded. State v. Cooperative
Sec. Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints, 122 Utah 134, 247 P.2d 269 (1952).
Service of summons is controlling date for
valuation purposes. State v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d
167, 397 R2d 463 (1964).
Value of condemned property under this section was "actual value" at time of service of
summons, including any enhancement in value
brought about by project requiring taking of
property in question, as long as this enhancement took place prior to service of summons.
State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d
317, 452 P.2d 872 (1969).
Property owners were entitled to compensation and damages based on value of their condemned property as of date on which state's
right to condemn was finally determined, which
was over seven years after service of summons,
where delay was due to federal court actions
and injunctions resulting from property owners' efforts to compel state to comply with
federal law in condemning their property for
purposes of constructing a belt-loop as part of
interstate freeway system. Utah State Rd.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. — 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 267
et seq.

Key Numbers. — Eminent Domain «=
198(1).

78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action — Deposit paid into court — Procedure for payment
of compensation.
The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof, at any time after the
commencement of suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the
state, or has appeared by attorney in the action, otherwise by serving a notice
directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order permitting the plaintiff
to occupy the premises sought to be condemned pending the action, including
appeal, and to do such work thereon as may be required. The court or a judge
thereof shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the premises
sought to be condemned and of the damages which will accrue from the
condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall
grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative
damages which may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court
or judge shall enter its order requiring the plaintiff as a condition precedent to
occupancy to file with the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75%
of the condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property sought to be
condemned. The amount thus fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only,
and shall not be admissible in evidence on final hearing. The rights of just
compensation for the land so taken or damaged shall vest in the parties
entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded as
provided in Section 78-34-10 and established by judgment therein, and the
said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest
at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the
property and damages, from the date of taking actual possession thereof by the
plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment; but
interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have been paid into
court. Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court shall order that
the money deposited in the court be paid forthwith for or on account of the just
compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. A payment to a defendant as
aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses
excepting his claim for greater compensation. If the compensation finally
awarded in respect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall exceed the
amount of the money so received the court shall enter judgment against the
plaintiff for the amount of the deficiency If the amount of money so received by
the defendant is greater than the amount finally awarded, the court shall enter
judgment against the defendant for the amount of the excess. Upon the filing
of the petition for immediate occupancy the court shall fix the time within
which, and the terms upon which, the parties in possession shall be required
to surrender possession to the plaintiff. The court shall make such orders in
respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, assessments, insurance and other
charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-9; L. 1967, ch. 220, § 1.

Cross-References. - Officers before whom
affidavits may be taken, § 78-26-5.

Exhibit 6

43<T Utah

734 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

project is federally funded, then ten percent of the contracts awarded must be given to DBE businesses. In the Commission's conclusions of law, it is stated:
"Whether we agree or disagree with the
philosophy embodied in the 'set aside' programs, they do exist, and Applicant is in a
preferred position to obtain such work. In
our estimation, that substantially enhances
his chances to survive economically."
Thus, the Commission focused on applicant's minority status only to the extent
that it enhanced his employment opportunities and thereby strengthened the prospects for the success of his hauling business. This was not improper.
We find that the Commission's findings
of fact as they relate to both alleged claims
of error were not outside "the tolerable
limits of reason" or "so unreasonable that
[they] must be deemed capricious and arbitrary." Utah Department of Administrative Services, 658 P.2d at 612 (citations
omitted).
Affirmed.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, J.,
concur.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring).
I join the majority opinion except for that
portion which contains language suggesting that in order for the PSC to properly
approve the issuance of a certificate of
convenience and necessity under section
54-6-5 of the Code, it must affirmatively
find the applicant financially fit. Slip op.
at 3. This is the position taken before this
Court by the Department of Business Regulation. The PSC, on the other hand, contends that under the statute, it is to issue a
certificate unless it affirmatively finds the
applicant un fit
The relevant statutory language provides:
Before granting a certificate to a common motor carrier, the commission shall
take into consideration the financial ability of the applicant to properly perform
the service sought under the certificate
If the commission finds that
the applicant is financially unable to

properly perform the service sought under the certificate . . . the commission
shall not grant such certificate.
U.C.A., 1953, § 54-6-5 (1974 ed.) (emphasis
added).
It seems clear to me that the PSC's position is the correct one: the statute requires
the Commission to take financial factors
into account in deciding whether to issue a
certificate, but it presumes that an applicant will be entitled to a certificate. The
burden is on one seeking a denial of the
application. In contrast, the Department
argues for a presumption against granting
a certificate and contends that the burden
is on the applicant to show its fitness. I
think the Department turns the statute on
its head. The statutory policy is a sound
one; unless a good reason is shown for
withholding a certificate, one should issue.
The language in the majority that can be
read as indicating that we accept the Department's position is unnecessary to the
decision and can only confuse the matter.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the
concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.

REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OP
SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Oscar Y. GRUTTER and Delia E.
Grutter, his wife, Defendants.
No. 18879.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 26, 1986.
Condemnation proceeding was brought
involving property condemned pursuant to
redevelopment plan. Property owners appealed from judgment of the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Kenneth Rigtrup,

REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY v. GRUTTER
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J., challenging its determination of fair
market value. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that in condemnation proceedings, any enhancement or decrease in value
attributable to purpose for which property
is being condemned would be excluded in
determining fair market value of property.
Affirmed.
1. Eminent Domain <s=>124
Any enhancement or decrease in value
attributable to purpose for which property
is being condemned shall be excluded in
determining fair market value of property
in condemnation proceedings; repudiating
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist v.
Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862; State
v. Woolley, 15 Utah 2d 248, 390 P.2d 860;
State Road Commission v. General Oil
Co., 22 Utah 2d 60, 448 P.2d 718; State
Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d
317, 452 P.2d 872. U.C.A.1953, 57-12-13.
2. Eminent Domain <3=»124
Trial court properly refused to allow
evidence concerning effect of redevelopment plan, pursuant to which property was
condemned, on issue of fair market value
of property; changing value of property
due to project was to be disregarded in
assessing property. U.C.A.1953, 57-12-13.
William D. Oswald, Harold A. Hintze,
Salt Lake City, for respondent.
Mark S. Miner, Kerry P. Egan, Salt Lake
City, for appellant.
DURHAM, Justice:
This is an appeal in a condemnation proceeding brought by the plaintiff, Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, involving
property owned by defendants, Oscar and
Delia Grutter. The property was condemned pursuant to the Jackson Redevelopment Plan. The only issue before the
court below was the fair market value of
the property. Defendants appeal the
amount of the jury award, claiming the
trial court erred in refusing to allow evidence concerning the effect of the Jackson
Neighborhood Development Plan on the

value of the property, thereby denying the
defendants the ability to show the highest
and best use to which the property could be
put at the time of the taking and the opportunity to prove that such use was reasonably probable in the near future. For the
reasons discussed below, we affirm.
The parties stipulated before trial that
plaintiff had the right to condemn defendants' land, consisting of approximately twothirds of an acre in Salt Lake City. At the
time of condemnation, March 2, 1981, defendants' property was zoned R-6. Multiple unit housing is allowed on property
zoned R-6, subject to certain restrictions
relating to parking and access to the property. Defendants sought to introduce evidence at trial regarding the number of
units to be placed on defendants' property
as a factor to be considered in determining
its value for compensation purposes. The
trial court allowed the testimony of defendants' expert that R-6 zoning allowed up to
twenty-five units on defendants' prof>erty.
However, the trial court refused to allow
evidence regarding the Jackson Neighborhood Development Plan. The Jackson
Plan, which was approved and adopted by
ordinance of the Salt Lake City Commission on August 26, 1980, is a master plan
for the renovation of the neighborhood in
which defendants' property is located. It
would allow up to eighty units per acre in
that neighborhood, including defendants'
property. The sole issue on appeal is
whether the trial court erred in not permitting defendants to introduce evidence
about the Jackson Neighborhood Development Plan.
It appears from the record that defendants failed to establish a proper foundation
for the introduction of the excluded evidence, or to adequately preserve the issue
for appeal. Our research, however, has
revealed such confusion in the law on the
substantive issue argued in this case that
we have determined to treat it on the merits.
[1,2] U.C.A., 1953, § 57-12-13, a statute not cited by either of the parties,
states:
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Any agency acquiring real property as
to which it has the power to acquire
under the eminent domain or condemnation laws of this state shall comply with
the following policies:
(3)
Any decrease or increase of
the fair market value of real property
prior to the date of valuation caused
by the public improvement for which
such property is acquired or by the
likelihood that the property would be
acquired for such improvement, . . .
will be disregarded in determining the
compensation for the property.
While this statute applies only to "agencies," and not to the courts, it does express
a clear legislative policy to the effect that
any change in the value of the property
due to the project for which the property is
being condemned is to be disregarded in
assessing the property. This statute was
passed in 1972.
This Court first mentioned the enhancement issue in dicta in Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d
29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959). Although the
Ward case was decided on grounds other
than the method of evaluation used, the
valuation issue was discussed in order to
instruct the trial judge about how to treat
the case on remand. In Ward, we rejected
the majority view and allowed the property
owner to be compensated for the increased
value of his land caused by the announcement of the project for which the property
was being condemned. We did not specify
what was to be done about decreases in
value.
We later cited Ward in State v. Woolley,
15 Utah 2d 248, 390 P.2d 860 (1964), a case
in which we reviewed a condemnation of
land for the construction of a highway. In
Woolley, the landowner introduced evidence that the condemned land had special
value because it was near the Utah-Wyoming border and well suited for a service
station. We affirmed the trial court's determination that such evidence of special
value was admissible. Although Woolley
was not a case dealing with enhancement,

we cited the enhancement language from
Ward with approval.
We next considered the issue in State
Road Commission v. General Oil Co., 22
Utah 2d 60, 448 P.2d 718 (1968). In that
case, we inaccurately referred to the Ward
enhancement language as the "holding" of
that case. In General Oil, the state condemned land for 1-15. The trial court allowed evidence of sales of similar properties, whose values had been enhanced by
the proposed freeway construction, to be
admitted into evidence over the State's objection. We subsequently upheld the trial
court, relying on the "holding" in Ward
22 Utah 2d at 62-63, 448 P.2d at 798.
Thus, nine years after we wrote the dicta
relating to enhancement in Ward, we relied
upon that dicta as stare decisis in General
Oil
This line of cases was again cited in
State Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Utah
2d 317, 452 P.2d 872 (1969). Wood raised
the question of what standards must be
met for properties to be similar enough to
the condemned property for use as "comparables" in the appraisal process; the enhancement question was presented because
the property owner introduced evidence at
trial of sales of comparable property zoned
residential, although his own property had
been rezoned as industrial in anticipation of
the condemnation for highway use. This
Court affirmed the trial courtfs evidentiary
ruling, even though it had the effect of
preventing a consideration of a decrease in
the value of the property because of the
proposed condemnation. Inexplicably in
that context, Wood restated the "Utah
rule" on enhancement, citing to Woolley,
Ward, and General Oil as the foundation
for the rule. 22 Utah 2d at 319, 452 P.2d
at 873. The dicta in Wood was subsequently cited by Professor Nichols. 4 J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12.3151 n. 1 (3rd ed. 1985).
Our review of Utah case law convinces
us that this Court has never squarely faced
the enhancement issue in a case in which it
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was relevant to the holding.1 In addition
to having dubious antecedents, the Utah
"rule" now expressly conflicts with legislative intent and is contrary to the rule applied by a majority of other jurisdictions.
Therefore, we deem it appropriate to enunciate a new rule on the valuation question.
We hold that in condemnation proceedings any enhancement or decrease in value
attributable to the purpose for which the
property is being condemned shall be excluded in determining the fair market value
of the property. This rule conforms to
legislative intent and to sound policy.
Affirmed.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE,
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

V

: KEY NUMBER SYSTEM,

^^A'^A^i

SPECIALTY CABINET CO., INC.,
and/or State Insurance
Fund, Plaintiffs,
v.
Mark A. MONTOYA, Industrial Commission of Utah, and Second Injury
Fund, Defendants.
UTAH TECHNICAL COLLEGE and
State Insurance Fund, Plaintiffs,
v.
William S. MARCHANT and Industrial
Commission of Utah, Defendants.
Nos. 19895, 20051.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 28, 1986.
State insurance fund and employers
appealed from allowance of workers' compensation benefits. The Supreme Court,
1. The issue was squarely presented in General
Oil, but we relied on the dicta in Wood rather

Zimmerman, J., held that workers were injured "by accident" and their injuries occurred "in the course of [their] employment," thus entitling them to benefits.
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., concurred in result.
Workers* Compensation <s=>517
Workers who suffered progressive
back and knee injuries were injured "by
accident" and their injuries occurred "in
the course of [their] employment," thus
entitling them to benefits, despite contention that precipitating event had to be time
definite, identifiable and unusual occurrence and not something simply which happened within normal stresses and strains of
employment activity. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
Fred R. Silvester and James R. Black,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Prank V.
Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
Gilbert A. Martinez, Richard S. Clark, II,
Provo, for defendants.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
The State Insurance Fund and the employers involved in the two cases here decided, Specialty Cabinet and Utah Technical
College, appeal from allowance of workers'
compensation benefits to Mark Montoya
and William Marchant under U.C.A., 1953,
§ 35-1-45 (1974 ed. & Supp.1986). The
question in each case is whether the employee suffered an injury "by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment." Both cases are ruled by the holding in our recent case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 729 P.2d 15 (1986).
Based upon Allen, we hold that these employees were both injured "by accident"
and that their injuries occurred "in the
course of [their] employment," thus entitling them to benefits.
Claimant Montoya, a shop foreman for
Specialty Cabinet Company since December
than analyzing the issue.
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UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Arnold FRIBERG and Hedve Friberg, his
wife, and Tracy Collins Bank and Trust
Company, Defendants and Appellants.

1. Eminent Domain <S=131
For compensation and condemnation
proceeding to be "fair and just," it must
reflect fair value of land to landowner.
(Per Stewart, J., with one Justice concurring.) Const. Art. 1, § 22.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

No. 17275.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 1, 1984.

State Road Commission brought action
to condemn part of real property owned by
landowners, which was to be used for freeway construction project. Order of immediate occupancy was granted, but landowners remained in possession of property in
question for approximately seven and onehalf years. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., entered
order requiring property to be valued as of
date summons was served, and landowners
were granted leave to file an interlocutory
appeal. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that: (1) order of immediate occupancy
did not, under principles of res judicata, bar
landowners from contesting state's power
to condemn in plenary proceedings; (2) delay occasioned in establishing state's right
to condemn occasioned by federal actions
would not justify penalizing landowners by
valuing property as of date of service of
summons rather than as of date property
was finally condemned; and (3) where
value of landowners' property substantially
increased between service of summons and
establishment of right to condemn, landowners were entitled to have property valued as of date right to condemn was established.
Reversed and remanded.
Oaks, J., filed concurring opinion.
Hall, C.J., filed dissenting opinion.
Howe, J., concurred in dissenting opinion of Hall, C.J.

2. Eminent Domain <£=124
A number of factors may affect value
of property taken pursuant to condemnation proceedings, including nature of legal
procedures established for taking private
property. (Per Stewart, J., with one Justice concurring.)
3. Eminent Domain <3=>124
Critical factor in determining value of
property taken pursuant to condemnation
proceedings is date fixed for valuing property in relation to when condemnor acquires title; substantial interval between
date of valuation and the latter date may
call in question fairness of valuation, especially when value of property has been
substantially affected in period between
valuation and actual taking. (Per Stewart,
J., with one Justice concurring.)
4. Eminent Domain <§=>123
When valuation of property taken pursuant to condemnation proceedings is fixed
at date prior to actual taking and value of
property increases during a prolonged condemnation proceeding so that valuation
does not reflect fair valuation of property
and does not therefore constitute "just
compensation," statute fixing time of valuation is unconstitutional as applied; to comport with constitutional requirements in a
particular case, it is necessary, therefore,
to consider whether protraction of judicial
proceedings and other circumstances that
affect value of land have had such an effect as to make valuation as of statutorily
determined date unfair. (Per Stewart, J.,
with one Justice concurring.) Const. Art.
1, § 22.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
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5. Eminent Domain <3=>124
In determining whether valuation date
fixed by statute would result in unjust
compensation, court may have to consider
numerous factors influencing value, including, for example, fact that announcement
of area-wide redevelopment plan by
government agency, prior to initiation of
any condemnation proceedings, may result
in severe depreciation in land value use
long before condemnation proceedings commence; thus, once judicial proceedings
have commenced to condemn a limited
number of parcels in a large project involving numerous parcels, there may be substantial adverse impact on value of remaining property not initially included in
project. (Per Stewart, J., with one Justice
concurring.) Const. Art. 1, § 22.
6. Eminent Domain <s=>124
Important and fundamental right protected by takings provision of State Constitution cannot be made subject to unfair
protraction or manipulation of condemnation process nor to the effect of legal rules
or procedures that take no account at all of
numerous factual variables that affect fair
values; failure to take into account a loss
of value caused by condemnation process
itself in determining just compensation
would result in an expropriaton of the value of private property. (Per Stewart, J.,
with one Justice concurring.) Const. Art.
1, § 22.
7. Eminent Domain <3=>124
To avoid expropriation of value of private property taken pursuant to condemnation proceedings, valuation dates may have
to be set prior to service of summons when
value of condemned property, not initially
included in area to be condemned, has been
diminished by condemnation by nearby
property pursuant to planned condemnation of a large area; by same token, valuation date later than that established by
statute may be required when a delay in
proceedings results from causes for which
condemnee is not responsible and delay
would result in nonrecognition of value in
award of compensation. (Per Stewart, J.,

with one Justice concurring.)
I, § 22.

Const. Art.

8. Eminent Domain <e=>122
Constitutional guarantee of just compensation for land taken pursuant to condemnation proceeding protects private
property owners, not the state. (Per Stewart, J.T with one Justice concurring.)
Const. Art. 1, § 22.
9. Eminent Domain <s=>123
Statute providing that assessment of
compensation and damages in condemnation action shall be deemed to accrue as of
date of service of summons allows an appropriate adjustment in date of valuation to
be made to protect state against having to
pay an award of compensation unfair to it
if publicly announced general plan of areawide condemnation has affect of artificially
increasing value of properties not initially
included in area to be condemned before
judicial proceedings have been commenced,
thereby resulting in windfall to landowner.
(Per Stewart, J., with one Justice concurring.) U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11.
10. Eminent Domain <s=>123, 124
Although statute providing that assessment of compensation and damages in
condemnation action shall be deemed to
accrue as of date of service of summons
would be unconstitutional as applied if it
required valuation of landowners' property
as of date of service of summons irrespective of all circumstances affecting value
and even though value of their property
had substantially appreciated during the
approximately seven and one-half years between service of summons and state's establishment of its right to condemn, statutory term "deemed to have accrued" admits a more flexible construction and does
not mandate that date of service of summons be date for valuation in all cases
without regard to facts of particular case.
(Per Stewart, J., with one Justice concurring.) U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11.
I I . Statutes <3>184, 205
Fundamental principle of statutory
construction is that a statute should be
construed as a whole, and its terms should
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be construed to be harmonious with each
other and overall objective of statute. (Per
Stewart, J., with one Justice concurring.)

taking of property is necessary and that
property will be dedicated to a public use.
Const. Art. 1, § 22.

12. Constitutional Law <S=>48(1)
Supreme Court is constrained to construe statutory terms to avoid an unconstitutional application of statute. (Per Stewart, J., with one Justice concurring.)

17. Eminent Domain <s=*200
Only after state has established elements of a cause of action for condemnation must property owner prove amount of
compensation to which he is entitled.
Const. Art. 1, § 22.

13. Eminent Domain <£=>200
Statute providing that an assessment
of compensation and damages in a condemnation action shall be "deemed to accrue"
as of date of service of summons creates a
rebuttable presumption that date for determining valuation shall be date of service of
process by its use of the term "deem"; to
rebut such presumption, unfairness of valuing property as of date of service must
be evident and difference in value must not
be insignificant. (Per Stewart, J., with one
Justice concurring.) U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11.
14. Eminent Domain <§=>124
Under statute providing that assessment of compensation and damages in a
condemnation action shall be deemed to
accrue as of date of service of summons,
valuation as of date of service will be the
rule, and departure from such rule will be
the exception. (Per Stewart, J., with one
Justice concurring.) U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11.
15. Eminent Domain <3=>200
Statutory presumption that property
taken in condemnation proceeding shall be
valued as of date of service of summons
may be rebutted either by the state or by
property owner by showing that valuation
as of date of service would result in an
award that would not provide "just compensation" to landowner or be fair to state;
burden to rebut such presumption is on
party which asserts that valuation as of
date of service would be unfair. (Per
Stewart, J., with one Justice concurring.)
U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11.
16. Eminent Domain <§=>196
In condemnation proceeding, state has
burden of coming forward with evidence
of, and burden of persuasion to establish,
its right to condemn; it must prove that

18. Eminent Domain e=>196
If condemnor's authority to condemn is
challenged, prima facie showing of right to
condemn must be made to support an order
of immediate occupancy, but a prima facie
showing is not final determination of authority; such showing simply requires
state to adduce some evidence to prove that
it has fulfilled necessary preconditions to
exercise of power ,of eminent domain, a
procedure similar to entry of preliminary
injunction. Const. Art. 1, § 22.
19. Eminent Domain <e=*187
Order of immediate occupancy pursuant to condemnation proceedings is entered
pendente lite and only authorizes state to
take immediate possession until final adjudication of merits.
20. Eminent Domain <3=>187
Order of immediate occupancy in condemnation proceeding, which expressly
stated that pending further hearing and
trial on issues presented in action and subject to conditions set forth, landowners
could not interfere with state's possession
of premises in question, and which made no
finding as to state's authority to condemn,
did not decide jurisdictional conditions
precedent to final order and decree; order
clearly contemplated that issues relating to
state's authority to condemn were to be
decided in further hearing.
21. Eminent Domain <S=>198(1)
State's right to condemn, if challenged,
can finally be determined only after trial on
merits, not at hearing on motion for immediate occupancy.
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22. Eminent Domain <3=>198(1)
Defendant may be barred from litigating merits of state's authority to condemn
after an order of immediate occupancy has
been granted if he waives his right to litigate such issues or he withdraws money
deposited by state in obtaining order; otherwise, condemnor's power to condemn
may be litigated in a plenary trial on the
merits. U.C.A.1953, 78-34-9^
23. Eminent Domain <3=>243(2)
Since an order of immediate occupancy
in condemnation proceedings only requires
prima facie proof of right to condemn, such
order is not a final adjudication on merits,
and thus, res judicata has no application to
such order.
24. Judgment <°^650
Res judicata has no application in absence of final adjudication.
25. Eminent Domain <£=>243(2)
Order in condemnation proceeding
granting state right of immediate occupancy, which right was challenged by landowners at hearing on motion for immediate
occupancy, did not, under rules of res judicata, prohibit landowners' express reservation of a right to contest state's power to
condemn in plenary proceedings.
26. Eminent Domain <3=>198(1)
Landowners are not required to meekly yield to state's claim to condemn their
land; every landowner has right to resist
with every legal means available the expropriation of his or her land. Const. Art. 1,
§ 22.
27. Eminent Domain e=>169
Since state has burden of proving its
right to exercise power to condemn, state
must be prepared to establish that it has
complied with all necessary conditions
precedent. Const. Art. 1, § 22.
28. Eminent Domain <s=*124
Delay of approximately seven and onehalf years in condemnation of landowner's
property occasioned by federal action seeking to enjoin state from further construction of freeway, the construction of which
resulted in an attempt to condemn landowner's property, until Environmental Im-

pact Statement was filed and another federal action challenging adequacy of such
statement once it was filed, would not justify penalizing landowners by requiring that
property be valued as of date of service
rather than as of date condemnation became final, since it was the state that had
affirmative obligation to comply with National Environmental Policy Act, despite
landowners' participation in initial federal
action. Const. Art. 1, § 22; U.C.A.1953,
78-34-11; National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, § 2 et seq., as amended 42
U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq.
29. States <s=>4.8
To penalize landowners' right to "just
compensation" for taking of condemned
land by compensating them for value of
land as of date of service of summons for
compensation proceeding rather than value
of land seven and one-half years later,
when right to condemn was established,
because of landowners' assertion of a federal right pursuant to action seeking to
enjoin freeway project pursuant to which
land was condemned until filing of an Environmental Impact Statement, would violate
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. (Per Stewart, J., with one Justice
concurring.) National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 2 et seq., as amended 42
U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq.; U.C.A.1953, 7834-11; U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2.
30. States <3>4.1
State cannot penalize assertion of federal right by requiring individual asserting
it to give up state constitutional right.
31. Eminent Domain <S=>124
Where approximately seven and onehalf years elapsed between service of summons to condemn landowner's land and establishment of state's right to condemn,
and where there was substantial increase
in value of landowners' property during
period that proceeding was pending, difference in the valuation of landowners' property between date of service and summons
and date when right to condemn was settled was "evident and significant," and
thus, landowners were entitled to have land
valuated as of date state's right to con-
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demn was settled. Const. Art. 1, § 22;
U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Robert S. Campbell, E. Barney Gesas,
Roy B. Moore, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Donald
S. Coleman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
The Utah State Road Commission (hereafter "the State")* commenced this action
June 23, 1972, to condemn a part of real
property owned by Arnold and Hedve Friberg. The property was to be used for
construction of the southeast segment of
1-215, a belt-loop freeway project in Salt
Lake County. The trial court granted an
order of immediate occupancy in December,
1972, but for various reasons discussed below, the completion of the condemnation
proceedings was delayed, and the Fribergs
remained in possession pursuant to a stipulation until approximately March 15, 1980.
The defendants contend that after June,
1972, the value of the Fribergs' property
appreciated substantially. Prior to a trial
to determine compensation to be held in
1980, the Fribergs moved to have the property valued as of the date the State finally
established its legal right to condemn, December 12, 1979. The trial court ruled that
the property was to be valued when summons was served pursuant to U.C.A., 1953,
§ 78-34-11, some seven and one-half years
earlier. Because of the importance of the
question involved, this Court granted leave
to file an interlocutory appeal.
The Fribergs' contention on appeal is
that § 78-34-11, which states that the assessment of compensation and damages in
a condemnation action shall be deemed to
accrue as of the date of service of summons, does not necessarily fix the date of
valuation as of that date when there has
1. The Utah Department of Transportation is the
successor agency to the Utah State Road Commission. Under Utah law, a number of governmental and private entities have been granted
the power to take private property by eminent
domain. In this opinion, we use the term

been a long delay in the entry of a final
decree and the property has substantially
appreciated in value in the intervening
time. Alternatively, they argue that if
§ 78-34-11 does require valuation in all
cases to be determined as of the date of
service of summons, that section is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this
case. The State's position is threefold: (1)
§ 78-34-11 fixes valuation as of the date of
service of summons irrespective of delay in
the entry of a final decree; (2) the Fribergs' property should be valued as of that
date in any event because the order for
immediate occupancy, entered shortly after
service of process, established the State's
right to condemn and occupy the Fribergs'
property; and (3) in any event, the Fribergs
were responsible for the delay in prosecuting this action and should not be permitted
to profit from that delay.
I. THE FACTS
The Fribergs owned 5.33 acres located in
the east Cottonwood area of the Salt Lake
Valley, where they lived for some 20 years.
In June, 1972, the State commenced judicial
proceedings to condemn the westerly 2.58
acres of the Friberg property. In August,
1972, the Fribergs filed their answer, alleging that the State had failed to comply with
statutory and jurisdictional requirements
necessary to establish its right to condemn
the Friberg property and therefore had no
authority to condemn the property.
The parties by a stipulation dated December 6, 1972, agreed that an order of immediate occupancy could be entered, and on
December 14, 1972, some three months after the Fribergs filed their answer, the
district court entered an order granting the
State immediate occupancy, pendente lite.
The order also incorporated the terms of a
stipulation between the parties which provided that (1) the State would deposit with
the clerk of the district court $80,800 payable immediately to the plaintiffs; (2) the
"State" to refer to the plaintiff in this action and
to condemnors generally where the text indicates that the term should be so construed since
the principles announced herein should apply
irrespective of who the condemnor is.
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Fnbergs could remain on the property rentfree until September 1, 1973, and thereafter on a month-to-month basis; and (3) the
Fribergs were entitled to thirty days' notice before being required to vacate the
property. The Fribergs left the funds on
deposit with the court, and thereby preserved their right to challenge the authority of the State to condemn the property. 2
On August 14, 1973, after the federal
lawsuit referred to below was filed, the
State notified the Fribergs that they were
to vacate the premises by October 1, 1973,
but also indicated that the Fribergs could
remain in possession under certain conditions. Apparently because of uncertainty
that their property would in fact be utilized
for the specified project, the Fribergs, in
response to the notice to vacate, moved to
dismiss the condemnation proceeding. The
motion was denied when the State agreed
that the Fribergs could remain in possession as long as possible.
On July 13, 1973, an action was commenced in the United States Federal District Court for the District of Utah by a
group of citizens from the Cottonwood area
in Salt Lake County who opposed the alignment of the proposed freeway through the
suburban area in which they resided. The
action sought to enjoin the State from further construction of the freeway until an
Environmental Impact Statement (E.I.S.)
was filed pursuant to the National Environ2. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-9 provides for a waiver
of all defenses except for a claim of greater
compensation if the deposit is withdrawn. It
states in pertinent part
The plaintiff may move the court or a judge
thereof, at any time after the commencement
of suit, on notice to the defendant,
for an
order permitting the plaintiff to occupy the
premises sought to be condemned pending the
action, including appeal, and to do such work
thereon as may be required The court or a
judge thereof shall take proof
of the value
of the premises
and of the damages which
will accrue
, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall grant or
refuse the motion according to the equity of
the case
A payment to a defendant [of
the value of the property] shall be held to be
an abandonment by such defendant of all
defenses excepting his claim for greater compensation
Upon the filing of the petition

mental Policy Act of 1969, § 2, et seq., 83
Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq. (1976).
The Fribergs were among the named plaintiffs who filed the federal action. The
State admitted that it had not filed an
E.I.S. In January, 1974, the federal court
ordered the State to prepare and file an
E.I.S. and enjoined the State, pending the
filing of an E.I.S., from performing any
further construction activities related to
the belt-loop project. 3 Some four years
later, the State filed an E.I.S., which was
finally approved by the Federal Highway
Administration on February 7, 1978, approximately five years and eight months
after service of the summons and complaint in the instant case.
For more than a year following the approval of the E.I.S., the Commission did
nothing to proceed with construction of I 215 in the area near the Friberg property
and took no action to have the Fribergs
vacate the property. Although the record
is not entirely clear on the point, the reason
for this delay appears to have been the lack
of funds for the project. In any event, the
delay was not attributable to the Fribergs,
although they clearly wanted to remain in
possession as long as possible.
On February 6, 1979, approximately ten
months after approval of the E.I.S., a second federal action challenging the adequacy of the E.I.S. was commenced by Cottonwood, Inc., a neighborhood citizens' group
for immediate occupancy the court shall fix
the time within which, and the terms upon
which, the parties in possession shall be required to surrender possession to the plaintiff.
3. The E.I.S. was required because the State utilized federal matching funds for construction of
the freeway. The State did not contest the requirement that it prepare an E.I.S., although on
this appeal it contends that it voluntarily decided to comply with the Environmental Policy Act
even though it was not legally required to do so.
The State's contention is that the National Environmental Policy Act became effective after the
initiation of this project and therefore was not
applicable. That point was not litigated in the
federal court proceeding, and it is not pertinent
here. The critical point is the entry of the
federal injunction against further action in connection with the building of 1-215.
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from the same general area as the Fribergs. The Fribergs were neither members of Cottonwood, Inc., nor parties to the
action, although they did donate funds to
the organization. On May 7, 1979, the
federal district court again enjoined the
State from undertaking further actions
with respect to the 1-215 project pending a
determination of the sufficiency of the
E.I.S. The State did not oppose the issuance of the injunction. On October 31,
1979, that court held that the E.I.S. was
legally sufficient and dissolved the injunc-

indirect support of the two federal lawsuits.
Short]y

after

that

ru]jng)

the

State

served the Fribergs with a notice to vacate

the premises in compliance with the Decemb e r 14> m 2 Q r d e r o f i m m e d i a t e occupancy.
The Fribergs continued to resist and again
asserted that the State had not proved

the

prerequisites necessary to
e r n p o w e r t h e S t a t e t o c o n d e m n the Frib e r g g , p r o p e r t y . 5 Specifically, the Fribergs

Jurisdictional

agserted that there had been n0

evidence

re]ating to the publjc necessity for

taking

tl0n

Notwithstanding the delays caused by
the lawsuits, it was not until approximately
mid-November, 1979, that the Utah Department of Transportation4 completed the
"details for the final design of the northsouth segment of the Southeast Quadrant
between 4500 South and 6400 South," the
segment for which the Friberg property
was needed.

their property or the relative importance of
the public good and private injury. The
Fribergs also contended that resolution of
the Cottonwood, Inc. case, which was at
that time still pending in the federal district court, might result in the proposed
highway project's not going forward and
that any action by the state court should
await the outcome of the federal court action.

On September 19, 1979, while the federal
district court injunction was still in effect
in the Cottonwood case, the Fribergs filed
a motion in the instant case to dismiss the
complaint based on the State's failure to
prosecute. The Fribergs contended that
the property had appreciated substantially
in value during the long interval between
the commencement of the condemnation action in June, 1972, and their filing of the
motion to dismiss and that it would be
unfair to fix compensation as of a time
some seven years earlier. In October,
1979, the trial court denied the Fribergs'
motion to dismiss on the ground that the
delay in bringing the case to a conclusion
had resulted from the Fribergs' direct and

In December, 1979, after the conclusion
of the Cottonwood, Inc. case and the dissolution of the federal injunction, the parties
entered into a stipulation that was incorporated into a court order dated December
12, 1979. That order established the
State's right to condemn and reserved for
later determination the amount of compensation to be awarded and the date for determining valuation. The order also directed the Fribergs to vacate the premises on
or before March 15, 1980, and the disbursement to the Fribergs of the $80,800 the
State had deposited with the court. The
order specifically states that it was made
without prejudice to the Fribergs' contentions as to the compensation issues.

4. See footnote 1, supra.
5. The conditions precedent to a taking are established by U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-4:
Before property can be taken it must appear:
(1) That the use to which it is to be applied
is a use authorized by law;
(2) That the taking is necessary to such use;
and
(3) If already appropriated to some public
use, that the public use to which it is to be
applied is a more necessary public use.

In 1981, the Legislature amended § 78-34-4
to state:
"(3) That construction and use of all property
sought to be condemned will commence within
a reasonable time as determined by the court,
after the initiation of proceedings under this
chapter." The old section (3) became the new
section (4). In addition, the Legislature enacted
§ 78-34-19, which provides for an action to set
aside condemnation proceedings for failure to
commence or complete construction within a
reasonable time.
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The Fribergs' motion to fix the valuation
date as of the date the right to condemn
was established, December 12, 1979, rather
than the date of service of process was
denied by the trial court on the ground that
§ 78-34-11 required that the value of the
Friberg land be determined as of June 23,
1972, and this appeal followed.
II.

JUST COMPENSATION AND THE
VALUATION OF PROPERTY
[1] Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[p]nvate property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation/' The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives "as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from
technical concepts of property law," when
the State takes private property for the
public welfare. United States v. Fuller,
409 U.S. 488, 490, 93 S.Ct. 801, 803, 35
L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). For compensation to be
fair and just, it must reflect the fair value
of the land to the landowner. "Just compensation means that the owners must be
put in as good a position money wise as
they would have occupied had their property not been taken." State v. Noble, 6 Utah
2d 40, 43, 305 P.2d 495, 497 (1956).
[2,3] A number of factors may affect
the value of property taken pursuant to
condemnation proceedings, including the
nature of the legal procedures established
for taking private property. A critical factor is the date fixed for valuing property in
relation to when the condemnor acquires
title, or in this case, when entitlement to
condemn is established A substantial interval between the date of valuation and
the latter date may call in question the
fairness of the valuation, especially when
the value of the property has been substantially affected in the period between valuation and the actual taking.
6. In City of South Ogden v. Fujiki, Utah, 621
P.2d 1254 (1980), cited above, the condemning
authority did not take possession of the land
until a final judgment was entered. The landowner claimed that it was a denial of just compensation not to award interest on the compen
sation award from the date of service of process

Because an extraordinary delay occurred
in the instant case after the statutory date
fixed to value the Friberg property and the
State established its right to condemn, the
initial issue to be determined, assuming at
this point that defendants did not cause the
delay, is whether U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-11
requires the valuation to be determined as
of the date of service or whether it may
allow valuation at some time other than
when process was served. Section 78-3411 states that the right to compensation
and the date for assessing compensation
shall be deemed to accrue as of the date of
service of summons:
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto shall
be deemed to have accrued at the date
of the service of summons, and its actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to
be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but
injuriously affected, in all cases where
such damages are allowed, as provided in
the next preceding section [78-34-10].
No improvements put upon the property
subsequent to the date of service of summons shall be included in the assessment
of compensation or damages. [Emphasis
added.]
All the cases that have heretofore been
decided under this section or its predecessor have relied upon the date of service of
summons in determining valuation. E.g.,
City of South Ogden v. Fujiki, Utah, 621
P.2d 1254 (1980); State ex rel. Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d 317, 452 P.2d
872 (1969); State ex rel.
Engineering
Commission v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265
P.2d 630 (1953); Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732
(1905). In none of these cases, however,
was the delay in any degree comparable to
the instant case. 6
because the land had appreciated from 15% to
20% between the service of summons and the
final judgment. Because the City had not obtained an order of immediate occupancy, the
Court held that § 78-34-9 only authorized interest from the date of the City's actual occupation
and that the denial of interest did not constitute
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[4] We are, of course, constrained to
construe § 78-34-11 within the limitations
of constitutional requirements. When valuation is fixed at a date prior to the actual
taking and the value of the property increases during a prolonged condemnation
proceeding so that the valuation does not
reflect a fair valuation of the property and
does not therefore constitute "just compensation," the statute fixing the time of valuation is unconstitutional as applied. Orono-Veazie Water District v. Penobscot
County Water Co., Me., 348 A.2d 249
(1975). Accord State v. Griggs, 89 Ariz.
70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960); Sanitary
District
of Chicago v. Chapin, 226 111. 499, 80 N.E.
1017 (1907).7 A leading treatise in the area
of eminent domain law, 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 8.5[2], 8-108 to 8-111 (3d
ed. 1981), states:
In several states it is held that the filing
of the petition to condemn, being the
first actual step toward devoting the
property to a public use, marks a point of
time that is as fair and just to both
parties for fixing the value of the property as any that could be selected, and it
has, consequently, been adopted as the
established date as of which damages are
assessed. In such jurisdictions, however,
if a corporation unreasonably delays the
prosecution of its petition while the land
is advancing in value, the application of
the rule would work great wrong and
injustice to the owner, and the petitioner
would be able to acquire the property at
much less than its value at the date of
the t a k i n g . . . . Where the statute provides for the date of valuation at the
initial step in the acquisition process,
such as upon the passage of a resolution
authorizing the condemnation, and then
permits a protracted period of time for
the prosecution of the proceeding, during
a violation of Article I, § 22 of the Constitution.
No claim was made that the valuation date was
improper.
7. In Chapin, the Court stated:
The filing of the petition is the first actual step
toward devoting property to a public use, and
in ordinary cases that time is as fair and just
to both parties for fixing the value of the
property as any that could be adopted. At

which time the value of the property may
rise or fall, the statute is unconstitutional as conflicting with the constitutional
concept of "just compensation".
To comport with constitutional requirements in a particular case, it is necessary,
therefore, to consider whether the protraction of judicial proceedings and other circumstances that affect the value of the
land have had such an effect as to make a
valuation as of a statutorily determined
date unfair. In Uvodich v. Arizona Board
of Regents, 9 Ariz.App. 400, 453 P.2d 229,
235 (1969), the court, construing a statute
similar to Utah's, addressed the issue of
the fairness of valuing property that had
depreciated as a result of the taking:
State i\ Hollis [93 Ariz. 200, 379 P.2d
750 (1963)] recognizes that arbitrary application of A.R.S. § 12-1123 [setting the
valuation date of condemned property at
the time of service of summons], is not
required where application of the statute
would result in unjust compensation to
the property owner. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that the time as of
which the evaluation of the property
should be made must comport with the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case so as to assure the property owner
compensation which is just, as contemplated by the Arizona Constitution.
See also State i\ Hollisf 93 Ariz. 200, 379
P.2d 750 (1963).
In a similar vein, Board of County Commissioners of Garfield County v. Delaney, 41 Colo.App. 548, 592 P.2d 1338 (1978),
held that a statute requiring the determination of valuation as of the date of the order
of possession could not be construed strictly when the result would be fundamentally
unfair to the expropriated landowner. Cf
any rate, the rule is firmly established; but if
it should be applied to a case like this, where
the owner has not been brought into court,
and no steps have been taken for several
years, during which property has greatly advanced in value, it would result in wrong and
injustice.
80 N.E. at 1019.
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State v. Griggs, 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174
(1960). See generally Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d
751 (1971).
[5] In determining whether a valuation
date fixed by statute would result in unjust
compensation, a court may have to consider
numerous factors that influence value.
Uvodich v. Arizona Board of Regents, supra.
Experience teaches, for example,
that the announcement of an area-wide redevelopment plan by a government agency,
prior to the initiation of any condemnation
proceedings, may result in severe depreciation in land values long before the condemnation proceedings commence. Thus, once
judicial proceedings are commenced to condemn a limited number of parcels in a large
project involving numerous parcels, there
may be a substantial adverse impact on the
value of the remaining properties not initially included in the project. In City of
Cleveland v. Kacmarik,
17 Ohio Op.2d
135, 177 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ct.C.P.1961), the
court observed:
As houses begin to come down, tenants
in nearby homes move out, the neighborhood deteriorates or is deserted, vandalism often sets in, appearances and values
depreciate with the result that frequently
the property owner is greatly handicapped in presenting his case to the jury
by the time his land gets into court.
[6] The important and fundamental
right protected by Article I, § 22 of the
Utah Constitution cannot be made subject
to undue protraction or manipulation of the
condemnation process or to the effect of
legal rules or procedures that take no account at all of the numerous factual variables that affect fair values. A failure to
take into account a loss of value caused by
the condemnation process itself in determining just compensation would result in
8. A publicly announced general plan of areawide condemnation may have the effect of artificially increasing the value of properties not
initially included in the area to be condemned
before judicial proceedings have been commenced, therebv resulting in a windfall to the
landowner. See United Stares v. Miller, 317 U.S.
369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1942). Although

an expropriation of the value of private
property.
[7-9] To avoid such results, courts have
set valuation dates prior to the service of
summons when the value of condemned
property, not initially included in the area
to be condemned, has been diminished by
the condemnation of nearby properties pursuant to the planned condemnation of a
large area. Klopping v. City of Whittier,
8 Cal.3d 39, 104 Cal.Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d 1345
(1972); 1 L. Orgel, Valuation Under the
Law of Eminent Domain, § 105 at 447 (2d
ed. 1953). Cf United States v. Virginia
Electric and Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 81
S.Ct. 784, 5 L.Ed.2d 838 (1961). See generally Note, The Condemnor's Liability for
Damages Arising
Through
Instituting,
Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1967 Utah L.Rev. 548.
By the same token, a valuation date later
than that established by statute may be
required when a delay in the condemnation
proceedings results from causes for which
the condemnee is not responsible and the
delay would result in a nonrecognition of
value in the award of compensation. 8
[10] Therefore, if § 78-34-11 requires
the valuation of the Fribergs' property as
of the date of service of summons irrespective of all circumstances that affect value
and even though the value of their property had substantially appreciated by the
time the State established its right to condemn, § 78-34-11 would be unconstitutional as applied under Article I, § 22. See
Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal.3d 39,
104 Cal.Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d 1345 (1972);
Board of County Commissioners of Garfield County v. Delaney, 41 Colo.App. 548,
592 P.2d 1338 (1978); Orono-Veazie Water
District v. Penobscot County Water Co.,
Me., 348 A.2d 249 (1975). See generally
the constitutional guarantee of just compensation protects private property owners and not
the State, our interpretation of § 78-34-11, discussed infra, allows an appropriate adjustment
in the date of valuation to be made to protect
the State against having to pay an award of
compensation unfair to it.
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State v. Hollis, 93 Ariz. 200, 379 P.2d 750
(1963).
However, the language of § 78-34-11 admits of a more flexible construction than
that placed on it by the State. The statutory term "deemed to have accrued" does not
mandate that the date of service of summons be the date for valuation in all cases
and without regard to the facts of the
particular case.
[11,12] In the first place, a fundamental principle of statutory construction is
that a statute should be construed as a
whole, and its terms should be construed to
be harmonious with each other and the
overall objective of the statute. Cannon v.
McDonald, Utah, 615 P.2d 1268 (1980);
Crist v. Bishop, Utah, 520 P.2d 196 (1974).
Moreover, we are constrained to construe
statutory terms to avoid an unconstitutional application of the statute. State v.
Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 71 (1982); In re
Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085 (1981).
The Legislature's use of nonmandatory
language indicates a policy of flexibility.
That conclusion is emphasized by the provision of § 78-34-11 that no improvements
placed upon the property subsequent to
service of process shall be included in the
assessment of compensation and damages.
That provision would be redundant if the
prior sentence flatly required assessment
of compensation and damages in all cases
as of the date of service of summons.
Furthermore, the statutory
phrase
"deem to have accrued" imports a degree
of flexibility into the valuation scheme of
§ 78-34-11. The policy of flexibility is
demonstrated particularly by the word
"deem." The meaning of the term must of
course arise from its statutory context, see
11A Words & Phrases 181-87 (1971), as
well as its constitutional environment, especially when the validity of a statute and its
application are so closely dependent upon
conformity to strict constitutional requirements.
In a somewhat different context, we
have held that the term "deem" is to be
construed in light of the purpose to be

accomplished by the statute. In Brimm v.
Cache Valley Banking Co,, 2 Utah 2d 93,
269 P.2d 859 (1954), the Court stated that
the term "deem" may be construed to establish either a conclusive or a rebuttable
presumption, depending on the context in
which it is used. Under the statutory
scheme then under consideration, the Court
held that the term "shall be deemed"
should be construed to impose a rebuttable
presumption.
[13] The varying factors that may affect the determination of just compensation, the necessity of a practicable and reasonably predictable rule of procedure, and
the language of § 78-34-11 lead us to conclude that the term "deem" as used in
§ 78-34-11 creates a rebuttable presumption that the date for determining valuation
shall be the date of service of process.
To rebut that presumption, the unfairness of valuing property as of that date
must be evident and the difference in value
must not be insignificant. In the vast majority of cases, the date of service of summons will be the appropriate date for determining valuation, and no judicial time need
be expended in determining whether another date would be more advantageous to one
party or the other to some small degree.
We do not mean to imply that "slight"
violations of constitutional rights should be
overlooked. The perimeters of a constitutional right are not to be slowly constricted
by a series of slight, but ever encroaching,
violations. However, the right to just compensation is unlike any other constitutional
right; it depends on a fair and reasonable
estimate of money value. By necessity,
such a valuation does not turn on physically ascertainable facts or even on a more or
less precise formula for defining value, but
rather on variable and imprecise judgments
made by reasonable persons who generally,
if not always, come to different conclusions.
Neither the constitutional right of the
landowner or the right of the State to
fairness would find root in firmer ground if
the statutory language were construed so
loosely as to permit the service of sum-
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mons date to be regularly challenged on
the basis of appraisals that, at most, might
result in minor differences in the valuation.
On the contrary, the constitutional right
and the interests it protects, both directly
and indirectly, are accorded greater protection by a substantial degree of certainty,
which will reduce the cost of litigation and
promote the expeditious disposition of condemnation suits, thereby allowing the condemnee to adjust with as little disruption
as possible to the impact of the condemnation.
[14] Since in any given case the number
and type of factors that affect value and
the weight to be accorded each factor will
vary, it is not possible to formulate a precise guideline for when a court should adhere to the service of summons date and
when it should depart from it; the nature
of the problem simply does not permit
greater precision. Suffice it to state that
valuation as of the service of summons
date will be the rule, and departure from
that rule will be the exception.
[15] Finally, it should be noted that the
presumption established by § 78-34-11
may be rebutted either by the State or by a
property owner by a showing that a valuation as of the date of service of summons
would result in an award that would not
provide "just compensation'' to a landowner or be fair to the State. It follows that
the burden to rebut the presumption established by § 78-34-1 is on the party which
asserts that valuation as of the date of
service of summons would be unfair.9
III. DELAY IN PROCEEDINGS
The State contends that the trial court
found that the State had met all the statutory and constitutional requirements necessary for the State to establish its right to
condemn the property when the trial court
entered its order of immediate occupancy
9. The concurring opinion reads § 78-34-11 to
fix the date of valuation at the time of service of
summons only when the right to condemn is
actually adjudicated, irrespective of whether valuation is also adjudicated. That construction
strains the plain meaning of § 78-34-11 and

on December 14, 1972. Based on that conclusion, the State asserts that the Fribergs
thereafter remained on the property solely
by the permission of the State. The State's
theory seems to be that entitlement to condemn was established at that time. In
addition, the State contends that the delay
in this case is attributable solely to the
Fribergs' own actions and that they should
not be permitted to profit from a delay
they themselves caused.
A. Order of Immediate Occupancy
[16,17] We turn first to the issue of the
legal effect of the order of immediate occupancy. In a condemnation proceeding, the
State has the burden of coming forward
with the evidence of, and the burden of
persuasion to establish, its right to condemn. The State must prove that the taking of the property is necessary and that
the property will be dedicated to a public
use. Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal &
Irrigation Co,, 40 Utah 105, 118, 121 P.
584, 589 (1911), affd, 239 U.S. 323, 36 S.Ct.
101, 60 L.Ed. 307 (1915). See Williams v.
Hyrum Gibbons & Sons Co., Utah, 602
P.2d 684, 688 (1979); Monetaire Mining
Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consolidated
Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 426, 174 P. 172,
177 (1918). Cf. Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, Utah, 567 P.2d 182, 184 (1977).
Only after the State has established the
elements of the cause of action, must the
property owner prove the amount of compensation to which he is entitled. State ex
rel Road Commission v. Taggart, 19 Utah
2d 247, 430 P.2d 167 (1967); Utah Road
Commission v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305,
383 P.2d 917 (1963); Tanner v. Provo
Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., supra.
The State argues that because the Fribergs challenged the State's authority to
condemn at the hearing on the motion for
immediate occupancy, the doctrine of res
judicata bars the Fribergs from again adjudicating the State's power to condemn. On
would lead to the anomalous situation of requiring different valuation dates depending on the
extraneous factor of whether the right to condemn is contested. Neither the Fribergs nor the
State has asserted that position.
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that premise, the State concludes that its
right to condemn was fixed when the order
of immediate occupancy was entered and
that valuation as of the date of service of
process was fair and reasonable because
there had been no undue delay between the
time of service and the time the order of
immediate occupancy was entered. The argument is based on language in Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., 69 Utah 423, 437, 255 P.
672, 677 (1926):
Under [the predecessor to § 78-34-9]
it is apparent that the power of the court
to grant or refuse an application to occupy premises sought to be condemned,
"pending the action/' is, to a large extent, discretionary, depending upon the
showing of necessity for a speedy occupation. To wisely exercise the discretion
the court might well require the plaintiff
to make a showing, not only as to the
necessity for a speedy occupation, but
also a prima facie showing as to his
right to condemn, if that right be controverted. [Emphasis added.]
[18] The State misconstrues both the
language of Utah Copper and the nature
of a proceeding for immediate occupancy.
The above-quoted language only states that
if the condemnor's authority to condemn is
challenged, a prima facie showing of the
right to condemn must be made to support
an order of immediate occupancy. However, a prima facie showing of authority is
not a final determination of authority.
Such a showing simply requires the State
to adduce some evidence to prove that it
has fulfilled the necessary preconditions to
the exercise of the power of eminent domain, a procedure similar to the entry of a
preliminary injunction. The law could
hardly allow the State to expel a landowner
from his land before a final judgment is
entered without at least some proof of its
power to do so.
10. A defendant may be barred from litigating
the merits of the State's authority after an order
of immediate occupancy has been granted if he
waives his right to litigate those issues or he

[19] An order of immediate occupancy
is entered pendente lite and only authorizes the State to take immediate possession until a final adjudication of the merits.
"[A]n order of immediate occupancy is
nothing more than an interlocutory order/'
State ex rel. Road Commission v. Danielson, 122 Utah 220, 222, 247 P.2d 900, 901
(1952); Utah Copper Co. v. MontanaBingham Consolidated Mining Co., 69
Utah 423, 436, 255 P. 672, 676 (1926). See
also § 78-34-9 (which assumes that an order of immediate occupancy is an interlocutory order only).
[20] In the instant case, the order of
immediate occupancy, on its face, did not
decide the jurisdictional conditions precedent to a final judgment and decree. The
order states: "It is further ordered and
adjudged that pending further hearing
and trial on the issues that may be
presented in this action, and subject to
the conditions herein set forth" the Fribergs may not interfere with the State's
possession of the premises (emphasis added). The trial court made no findings as to
the State's authority to condemn. The order clearly contemplated that the issues
relating to the State's authority to condemn were to be decided in a "further
hearing."
[21-24] The State's right to condemn, if
challenged, can finally be determined only
after a trial on the merits, not at a hearing
on the motion for immediate occupancy.
State v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad
Co., 8 Utah 2d 236, 238, 332 P.2d 926, 927
(1958).10 Since an order of immediate occupancy only requires prima facie proof of
the right to condemn, that order is not a
final adjudication on the merits. Res judicata has no application in the absence of a
final adjudication. Cf Pegues v. Morehouse Parrish School Board, 706 F.2d 735
(5th Cir.1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391
(5th Cir.1981). See generally IB J. Moore,
withdraws the money deposited by the State in
obtaining the order. § 78-34-9. Otherwise, the
condemnor's power to condemn may be litigated in a plenary trial on the merits.
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J. Lucas, & T. Currier, Moore's
Practice § 0.409[1] (2d ed. 1983).

Federal

125] The Fribergs' express reservation
of their right to contest the power to condemn in plenary proceedings is not prohibited by the rules of res judicata. In fact,
as late as December 12, 1979, the Fribergs
and the State stipulated that the Fribergs
would convey title and that only two issues
would be reserved for an evidentiary trial:
the amount of damages and the date of
valuation.
B.

The Delay in Consummation
of Proceeding

The trial court found, and the State asserts on this appeal, that the sole blame for
the delay in the consummation of the condemnation proceedings rests on the Fribergs because they filed the first federal
court action against the State, which resulted in an injunction against the State's proceeding with the 1-215 project, and because
they financially supported the second federal action challenging the sufficiency of
the E.I.S., which also resulted in an injunction. The State also contends that when
undue delay occurs in a condemnation proceeding the only remedy is dismissal of the
action. Notwithstanding that position, the
State has successfully opposed two motions
to dismiss the action for the State's failure
to prosecute the case to a conclusion.
The Fribergs, on the other hand, contend
that the dominant reason for the long delay
between the service of summons and the
final acquisition of title by the State some
seven and one-half years later was the
State's failure to prosecute. Indeed, even
apart from the lengthy delays occasioned
by the two federal actions, the Fribergs
assert, and there is some record evidence to
support the assertion, that the State had
not even settled on a final alignment of the
highway until some time in 1979 or 1980.
Interstate 215 is a partially federallyfunded project, and the State had to comply
with the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). One requirement of that Act
is the preparation and filing of a study on
the impact of a federally funded project on

the environment. Although the State now
suggests that it was not subject to NEPA,
it nonetheless stipulated in the first federal
court action that it was and would file an
Environmental Impact Statement. The injunction issued in that case and in the
subsequent case, which wras filed to test
the adequacy of the State's E.I.S., had the
effect of placing the whole project in limbo,
including the legal proceedings against the
Fribergs.
[26] Preliminarily, we note that fault is
not really the issue here. The law does not
require landowners to meekly yield to the
State's claim to condemn his or her land.
Every landowner in this country has a
right to resist with every legal means available the expropriation of his or her land.
The right of eminent domain does not require docile passivity on the part of a landowner. Nor did the Fribergs engage in
tactics that unjustifiably protracted this litigation by demands for a series of continuances. All they did was pursue an established, well-recognized and well-founded legal remedy to compel the State to comply
with federal law. The Fribergs' neighbors
then challenged the validity of the E.I.S.
and the State's compliance with NEPA.
Although the State may have had a goodfaith belief that it did not have to comply
with NEPA, it nevertheless was stopped
dead in its tracks by federal court injunctions because it failed to comply with that
law. That failure existed even before the
State commenced action against the Fribergs.
[27, 28] Since the State has the burden
of proving its right to exercise the power to
condemn, Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consolidated Mines Co., 53
Utah 413, 174 P. 172 (1918); Tanner v.
Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40
Utah 105, 121 P. 584 (1911), the State must
be prepared to establish that it has complied with all necessary conditions precedent. The delay occasioned by the federal
actions cannot justify penalizing the Fribergs by denying them a part of the value
of their property, which appreciated while
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those actions were pending. It was the
State that had an affirmative obligation to
comply with NEPA, 11 and it was basically
the federal court proceedings that delayed
the condemnation action.

with the State's failure to comply with federal law, the Fribergs had a reasonable
expectation that the condemnation of their
land might ultimately prove unnecessary,

[29,30] The contention that the Fribergs
should lose the appreciated value of their
property because of their participation in
the federal action simply does not wash.
The State, as a matter of constitutional
law, cannot penalize the Fribergs' assertion
of a federal right by requiring it to give up
a state constitutional right. Cf. Lefkoivitz
v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38
L.Ed.2d 274 (1973); Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574
(1967); Terra! v. Burke Construction Co.,
257 U.S. 529, 42 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed. 352
(1922); Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton,
146 U.S. 202, 13 S.Ct. 44, 36 L.Ed. 942
(1892); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186,
7 S.Ct. 931, 30 L.Ed. 915 (1887); Doyle v.
Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 535, 24 L.Ed. 148 (1876); Insurance Co.
v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 22 L.Ed.
365 (1874). In sum, it would be a violation
of the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution to penalize a landowner's right to "just compensation" because
of the assertion of a federal right, and it
would be wholly unreasonable and invidious to penalize the assertion of a state
right because somebody else asserted a
federal right, as would be the case if the
Fribergs were penalized because of the second federal lawsuit.

IV. VALUATION DATE
[31] The instant case clearly calls for a
departure from valuing the Fribergs' property as of the date of service of process.
The period from the service of summons to
the establishment of the right to condemn
has been far greater than would normally
be required to prosecute a condemnation
case to a conclusion. There has been a
substantial increase in the value of the
Fribergs' land during the lengthy period
that the proceedings have been pending.
Although the record does not disclose how
much appreciation has occurred, we take
judicial notice of the fact that land values
in the Salt Lake Valley have increased substantially during the period in question because of general inflation in the economy
and a great increase in the population, accompanied by an increase in demand for
land in Salt Lake County. Those factors
require the conclusion that the difference
in the valuation of defendants' property
between the date of service of summons
and the date when the right to condemn
was settled is evident and significant. Furthermore, interest should be allowed on the
award from the date of the Fribergs' abandonment of the property. City of South
Ogden v. Fujiki, Utah, 621 P.2d 1254
(1980).

In short, the Fribergs' right to just compensation cannot be defeated because they
wanted to retain their land as long as possible. There was, after all, the possibility
that the alignment, which apparently was
not finally established until years after the
filing of the lawsuit, might have been
changed, thereby avoiding the necessity of
taking the Fribergs' land. Under those
circumstances, especially when combined

Reversed and remanded. Costs to appellants.

11. Although the State contends that it did not
have to comply with NEPA, we do not need to
address that issue. The State apparently did not
really litigate that issue in the federal district
court. Since the parties in those actions treated

DURHAM, J., concurs.
OAKS, Justice, (concurring):
I concur in the reversal and remand and
in Parts I and III of the Court's opinion,
except for the references to constitutional
NEPA as being applicable and injunctions were
issued, that is a sufficient basis for determining
that the delay caused by the litigation was not
the Fribergs' fault. See footnote 3.
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law in the last few paragraphs of Part
IIIB.

and both are referenced in the preamble to
§ 78-34-11.

I join the Court in its conclusion and
reasoning that in the circumstances of this
case neither the 1972 stipulation (quoted in
the dissent) nor the 1972 order of immediate occupancy deprived the Fribergs of
their right to litigate whether the State had
established the "conditions precedent to
taking" specified in § 78-34-4. The Fribergs did not "abandon" their right to litigate this question because they did not
withdraw the $80,000 that had been deposited pursuant to the order of immediate
occupancy.
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-9.
While I share the dissent's view that the
best interests of all concerned dictate that
the State's right to take by eminent domain
be resolved as soon as possible, property
owners who do not abandon their defenses
in the manner specified in § 78-34-9 must
have an opportunity to litigate them. Either party can bring that issue on for decision, with or without a simultaneous determination of damages. Because that was
not done in this case, the effect was to
postpone the date for the determination of
value, as explained below.

Since the Fribergs' compensation was
not "allowed" pursuant to the contested
proceeding contemplated in § 78-34-10 (after adjudication of the right to condemn),
the valuation date specified in § 78-34-11
is inapplicable to them. In this circumstance, the property owners are entitled to
a determination of value as of the date of
taking and to interest on the unpaid balance of that amount from that date or from
the date they relinquished possession,
whichever is later.

On remand, the court should award Fribergs compensation and damages on the
basis of the value of their property on the
date on which the State's right to condemn
was finally established by court order on
stipulation of the parties, December 12,
1979. This result follows from the fact
that the State's right to condemn the Friberg property and the amount of compensation and damages that had to be paid for
it were never adjudicated in a contested
proceeding. Section 78-34-11, which establishes the measure of compensation and
damages as the "actual value" at the "date
of the service of summons," only applies,
by its terms, to "all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the next
preceding section [78-34-10]." In the context of § 78-34-11 and its cross-reference
to § 78-34-10, the quoted reference to allowance of "damages" seems to me to include both compensation and damages.
Both subjects are treated in § 78-34-10,

In this view of the case, the constitutional discussion in Part II of the plurality
opinion is unnecessary. In my view, it also
raises troublesome questions that should
not be raised and need not be answered.
The summons date that § 78-34-11 specifies for valuation in adjudicated cases is a
certain answer to a vital question. That
certainty yields to confusion under Part II
of the plurality opinion, which turns the
statutory valuation date into a "rebuttable
presumption" that "imports a degree of
flexibility into the statutory valuation
scheme." Under that reasoning, the service-of-summons date could not constitutionally be applied to measure compensation or damages where the condemnation
proceeding was "prolonged" (elsewhere referred to as a "substantial interval" or
"extraordinary delay") and where the value
of the property had "substantially appreciated" during the interval before the right
to condemn was established "so that the
valuation does not reflect a fair valuation
of the property and does not therefore constitute 'just compensation.' " The complexities of administering a constitutional doctrine based on such generalities are evident. How much appreciation is "substantial"? How much delay in adjudication is
"extraordinary"? When does a proceeding
become "prolonged"? And if these conditions are satisfied, how much "flexibility"
in a valuation date does the Constitution
require?
We should not impose the necessity of
answering these questions in adjudicated
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cases. If there is a point at which state
delay in prosecuting a condemnation action
would cause the summons date to be unconstitutional as applied in a rapidly rising
market, that issue can be settled in a future case which presents it unavoidably.
The recent amendment of § 78-34-4(3) (requiring state use to commence within a
reasonable time after the initiation of condemnation proceedings) makes it less likely
that this issue will arise. In any event, it
need not be resolved on the facts of this
case.
HALL, Chief Justice, dissenting:
The dispositional issue presented by this
appeal is simply one of fact, namely:
whether the plaintiff unreasonably delayed
the condemnation proceedings so as to prejudice the Fribergs' right to appropriate
compensation and damages. The trial
court resolved this issue in favor of plaintiff, and its decision is supported by substantial evidence that precludes this Court
from substituting its judgment for that of
the trial court.1

According to an affidavit by Coleman, he
telephoned the Fribergs' counsel following
receipt of the above letter and agreed that
"as an accommodation to him [Coleman]
would delay proceeding to displace the defendants as long as he could." Coleman's
affidavit further states:
During the pendency of this action,
there have been several verbal communications between Affiant and counsel for
the defendants, and the request to delay
proceeding against the defendants has
been repeatedly made by defendants' attorney and Affiant has agreed to cooperate to the extent possible to avoid displacement of the defendants as long as
possible.
Affiant within the last month has received a verbal request from defendants'
counsel to delay proceedings to displace
said defendants until next year. Affiant
said while he could make no promises he
would see what could be done.

Following the Fribergs' 1972 stipulation
to "immediate occupancy" by plaintiff, the
Fribergs made several requests to Donald
Coleman, counsel for plaintiff, for cooperation by plaintiff in allowing them to remain
on the property as long as possible. A
letter written to Coleman on September 12,
1973, by counsel for the Fribergs contained
one such request:
In all events, the Fribergs wish to retain the use and occupancy of the property for as long as possible and to that end,
I will look to hearing from you

Considerable action has been undertaken in this case since December, 1972,
and the telephone conferences that have
taken place during the pendency of this
cause involved the discussion of issues
important to this case, such as deferring
displacement of defendants
The plaintiff has been ready, willing
and able to proceed with this cause of
action and would have done so had it not
been for the conduct of the defendants
and their counsel.
The Fribergs do not deny having made
such requests to plaintiff.
In addition to persuading plaintiff to
postpone condemnation proceedings, the
Fribergs themselves initiated federal litigation that prevented plaintiff from continuing with its plans for the beltway. In
Cottonwood Citizens Group v. Brinegar,2
a suit brought by the Fribergs and other
Cottonwood-area citizens, the citizens'
group alleged violations by plaintiff of federal environmental protection laws and
prayed for an order "enjoining defendants

1. Kinkella v. Baugh, Utah, 660 P.2d 233 (1983).

2. No. C-225-73 (D.Utah Jan. 11, 1974).

The record plainly shows that plaintiff
postponed final condemnation of the Fribergs' property until 1979 as an accommodation to the Fribergs, who, according to
their counsel, "didn't want to surrender the
property under any circumstances" and
wished to "stay as long as they could [in
the hope that] perhaps the highway would
never be built."

838

utah

687 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

from taking any action in connection with
the Project including .. authorizing or
permitting further or continued condemnation" until the alleged violations had been
corrected. In response, the federal district
court in which that suit was pending issued
an order requiring preparation of an environmental impact statement on the project
and suspending all related planning and
engineering work by plaintiff except as
necessitated by preparation of the impact
statement itself. The order also prohibited
construction work on the southeast quadrant and limited plaintiffs right to purchase property. This order effectively prevented plaintiff from proceeding with its
plans for the beltway between January,
1974, the date of its issuance, and April,
1978, the date of final approval of the
impact statement.
In February, 1979, following final approval of the impact statement, Cottonwood, Inc., a group to which the Fribergs
had contributed financially, filed a second
federal suit challenging the adequacy of
the impact statement. 3 Without waiting
for resolution of the further issues raised
by this second suit, plaintiff served the
Fribergs with a notice to vacate in June,
1979. The Fribergs continued to resist relinquishing their property, asserting in an
"Objection to [Notice to] Vacate Premises":
Until [the Cottonwood, Inc.,] case has
been resolved and until it is patently
clear that the said highway project will
proceed on a defined schedule in the immediate future, the property of these
Defendants should not be taken or condemned.
Less than three months later, the Fribergs filed a motion to dismiss the condemnation complaint for failure to prosecute,
relying on grounds similar to those argued
in support of the present motion. In denying that motion, the trial court found as
follows:
Although this action has been pending
some seven years, a good portion of the
delay can be placed upon the direct or
indirect conduct of the
defendants.
3. Cottonwood, Inc. v. Hurley, No. C-79-0081

They have either directly or indirectly
filed one or two actions in federal court
seeking the delay or cancellation of this
project. To now seek dismissal of this
case for nonprosecution
would be inequitable. [Emphasis added.]
It is clear that the Fribergs made every
effort to procrastinate the date of condemnation as long as possible and that they
would not have welcomed an earlier condemnation date even though this might
have enabled them to acquire other property at a time when prices were lower.
Counsel for the Fribergs stated in this regard:
[T]he Fribergs didn't want to surrender
the property under any circumstances
[M]oney wasn't the question. At
this point the question was could they
stay on the property.
It is true that the Fribergs should not be
penalized for having exercised their right
to litigate issues relating to the legality of
the beltway project and to plaintiff's right
to condemn. However, the Fribergs' right
to exercise all legal means of prolonging
the condemnation process did not include
the right to profit from the resulting delay
by claiming for themselves, in contravention of their stipulation and the well-established statutory valuation date, appreciation on the subject property caused by such
delay. Valuation of the Fribergs' property
as of the date of summons would not penalize them, nor would it deprive them of any
benefit that they would have obtained if
they had not exercised this right.
Moreover, the stipulation executed by
the parties in 1972 that authorized the
court to enter its order of immediate occupancy sets forth terms of compensation
that are wholly inconsistent with a 1979
valuation date. The stipulation reads in
toto as follows:
1. Plaintiff shall deposit with the
Clerk of the Court the sum of $80,000,
which shall be paid by the Clerk to the
defendants forthwith by delivering to
counsel of record for defendants the
(D.Utah Nov. 29, 1979).
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fore clearly unjust to allow the Fribergs,
by setting their own valuation date, to receive appreciation in addition to the substantial benefits already received under
their agreement.

check or warrant of plaintiff in the sum
of $80,000.
2. Defendants shall be entitled to remain in possession of the premises rent
free until September 1, 1973 and for periods thereafter on a month by month basis. Defendants shall be entitled to 30
day advance notice before being required
to vacate the premises.
3. Interest on any amount recovered
by defendants in addition to the $80,000
above mentioned will not begin to accrue
until defendants have vacated the premises. Interest from said point in time
shall be at the rate provided by Section
78-34-9 Utah Code Annotated as amended.
The foregoing stipulation afforded the
Fribergs two substantial monetary advantages, one of which is required by statute,4
but the second of which is neither contemplated nor required by statute.5 First,
their agreement that the sum of $80,000 be
paid forthwith placed the Fribergs in a
position to immediately invest those funds
as they saw fit. The fact that they subsequently chose not to accept the funds and
thus voluntarily deprived themselves of
that advantage is of no consequence in the
resolution of this appeal. Second, the stipulation permitted the Fribergs to remain in
possession of the property rent-free. They
have since enjoyed some eight years of
rent-free occupancy, which adequately compensates them according to their stipulated
bargain with plaintiff. As a rule of thumb,
monthly rental value is deemed to be a sum
equal to one percent of market value.
Even assuming that the $80,000 figure paid
over by plaintiff represented full market
value rather than only 75 percent thereof,
as required by statute, infra, the monthly
rental value was $800, or $9,600 per annum, and the Fribergs, over the eight-year
period, have had the advantage of rent-free
occupancy valued at $76,800. It is there-

The tenor and effect of the stipulation of
the parties was to relieve the plaintiff of
the need to present proof that the conditions precedent to a taking as provided by
§§ 78-34-4 and 78-34-9 had been met.
This is to be seen in that the plain language
of the stipulation reflects the agreement of

4. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-9.

7. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-9, supra.

5. Id.
6.

Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., 69 Utah 423, 255 P. 672
(1926).

U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-4 provides that before property can be taken it must appear
that the use to which it is to be applied is a
use authorized by law and that the taking
is necessary to such use. Section 78-34-9
empowers the court to grant immediate
occupancy of the premises pending final
determination of the condemnation proceeding. The power is largely discretionary,
and in the exercise of its discretion, the
court may well require a showing that the
proposed use is authorized by law and that
the taking is necessary for the contemplated use if those issues are in dispute.6
The court is obliged to take proof of the
value of the premises sought to be condemned, the damages that will accrue from
the condemnation and the reasons for requiring speedy occupation and shall grant
or refuse immediate occupation according
to the equity of the case and the relative
damages that may accrue to the parties.7
As a condition precedent to occupancy,
the condemnor must deposit with the clerk
of the court a sum equal to at least 75
percent of the condemnor's appraised value
of the property, and payment thereof to the
condemnee shall be held to be an abandonment of all defenses except the claim for
greater compensation.8 In this case, the
Fribergs agreed that payment of $80,000
would be made forthwith.

8. Id.
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the parties that plaintiff was entitled to
immediate occupancy. Furthermore, the
stipulation does not recite the existence of
a controversy as to the authority to take or
the necessity of the taking, and of course it
does not preserve any such issues for a
future determination. In the exercise of
its discretion, the court accepted the stipulation and entered its order of occupancy
without the necessity of a hearing and the
taking of evidence, and for all intents and
purposes the taking was then complete.
All that remained was a determination of
damages and the entry of judgment.9
The fact that the stipulation preserved
only the issue of damages for trial is not
surprising. On the contrary, it is wholly
consistent with the usual course of events
in condemnation proceedings. Whenever
issues pertaining to authority to condemn
or necessity of the taking exist at the time
an order of immediate occupancy is sought,
the best interests of all concerned, including those of the court, dictate that those
issues be resolved prior to the issuance of
the order of occupancy. Otherwise, the
condemnor runs the unnecessary risk of
defeat and the resultant loss of sums expended in preparing the property for its
new use. Similarly, the condemnee runs
the risk of irreparable harm to the property
if the condemnor is permitted to occupy
and alter the property to accommodate the
new use.
The particular facts of this case graphically illustrate the foregoing discussion.
Plaintiffs designated use of the property
entailed the construction of a remaining
segment of the belt-route highway system
9. As provided by U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-15.

in Salt Lake County. In light of the magnitude of such a project and the drastic
change it would make in the topography, it
seems beyond comprehension that the parties would agree to an order of immediate
occupancy if in fact legitimate issues of
authority or necessity of the taking remained to be resolved.
The main opinion concedes that it is impossible to formulate a guideline for when
the courts should depart from the statutory
date of service of summons for the purpose
of assessing compensation and damages.10
Therein lies the fallacy in considering a
departure therefrom at all. To do so invites controversy in every case and affords
a means for the parties to manipulate the
measure of compensation that has heretofore been prevented by adherence to the
statutory provision.
I remain unpersuaded that the facts of
this case should prompt this Court to depart from the explicit language of U.C.A.,
1953, § 78-34-11, which establishes the valuation date as of the date of service of
summons.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of HALL, C.J.
J^\
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10. Provided for by U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-11.

Exhibit 8

David R. Olsen, Esq. (2458)
Douglas H. Patton (5333)
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-0400

^

3 09 ftf

W

Alan W. Mortensen, Esq. (6616)
MORTENSEN & LUNCEFORD, PC
371 North 200 West
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801)294-2318
Attorneys for the Interveners

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

DAVIS COUNTY, a body politic of the State
of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Trustee
of the MAX KERR TRUST Dated November
26, 1996, and Interveners TOD B. JONES
and PAUL E. BARKER,

Civil No. 970700354 CD
Judge Thomas L. Kay

Defendants.

On February 14, 2000, at 1:30 p.m. the Court held a hearing to consider the parties*
Motions in Limine and to conduct a Pre-Trial Conference. Gerald E. Hess, Esq. appeared on
behalf of Davis County, George K. Fadel, Esq. appeared on behalf of Zions First National Bank,
trustee of the Max Kerr Trust, and David R. Olsen, Esq., Alan W. Mortensen, Esq. and Douglas

H. Patton, Esq. appeared on behalf of Interveners Tod B. Jones and Paul E. Barker. Having
considered the moving papers and having heard oral argument, the court ruled as follows:
Motions in Limine
1.

Plaintiffs motion to exclude evidence of assessed valuation of the property for tax

purposes is granted.
2.

Interveners' motion to allow evidence of comparable values of adjacent properties

is granted.
3.

Plaintiffs motion to exclude evidence of assemblage adjacent to the subject

property is vacated as moot by agreement of the parties.
4.

Plaintiffs motion to exclude evidence that Mr. Prows is the ultimate source of

funding to pay for the judgment in this matter is denied.
5.

Interveners' motion to exclude plaintiffs multiple and cumulative expert witnesses

is denied.
6.

Interveners' motion to exclude the opinion of Mr Throndsen is deferred.

7.

A ruling on interveners' motion to allow evidence of efforts to reduce the value of

the condemned property is deferred.
8.

The Court advised the parties that they may proceed at their own risk in

referencing documents and deposition testimony in their opening statements that may be excluded
from evidence at trial.

2

Pre-Trial Conference
The Court then turned its attention to various pre-trial matters and ruled as follows:
1.

On February 29, 2000, the parties shall submit requested jury instructions in the

form of two copies (one containing citations and one blank).
2.

On February 29, 2000, the parties shall submit proposed jury questionnaires, if

3.

On February 29, 2000, the parties shall exchange a list of exhibits they intend to

any.

use at trial as well as a list of witnesses that they will and may call at trial.
4.

The parties are instructed to appear on March 6, 2000, at 8:00 a.m. for jury

selection. Thereafter the court will normally conduct the trial between the hours of 8:30 a.m. to
12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. to 5.00 p.m.
5.

The parties have invoked the exclusionary rule, and therefore all witnesses except

for party representatives and experts shall be precluded from hearing testimony during trial.
6.

Davis County and defendant and interveners together, shall each be limited to four

peremptory challenges per side, i.e., four peremptory challenges for Davis County, and four total
peremptory challenges for Defendants and Interveners.
7.

Finally, the Court advised the parties that jurors will be permitted, at the close of a

witness's examination, to write questions and present them to the Court. The Court, in
conference with counsel for the parties, will determine whether such questions shall be put to a
particular witness.

3

IT IS SO ORDERED.
CONCLUSION
There being no other matter addressed or considered, the court hereby enters the
foregoing Order.
DATED this 2 5 f t l

day of

f ^ f a a t t * ^ . 2000.

BY THE COURT

The Honorable Thordas iL Kay

Approved as to form:

7"

y

G e r a l d ^ Hess
Attorney for Davis County
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